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MITIGATING DEATH
Emily Hughes*
Capital mitigation specialists are critical members of the capital
defense team. Their job involves investigating the life history of the de-
fendant in order to develop a comprehensive defense against execution at
the sentencing phase of a capital trial. To develop the life history of the
defendant, capital mitigation specialists must uncover as much informa-
tion as they can about the defendant from the defendant's family, friends,
and virtually any other person in the defendant's life. This Article exam-
ines the role of mitigation specialists who have formal social work train-
ing, exploring how legal ethics and world views they experience on
capital defense teams interact with ethical norms and world views they
learn as social workers. By understanding how ethical norms and world
views from law and social work interact, this Article strives to ensure
that interdisciplinary capital defense teams anticipate and resolve ethical
conflicts in order to safeguard the capital defendant's constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past eight years, the United States Supreme Court has been
vocal about the importance of capital mitigation specialists in death pen-
alty defense. Beginning with Williams v. Taylor in 2000,1 and continu-
ing with Wiggins v. Smith in 20032 and Rompilla v. Beard in 2005,3 the
Court launched a series of decisions underscoring the importance of thor-
ough capital mitigation investigation. 4 Through these decisions, the
Court examined trial counsel's failure to conduct extensive mitigation
investigation and found that failure to thoroughly investigate capital miti-
gation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.5
In addition to emphasizing that thorough mitigation investigation is
critical to achieving effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing
phase of a capital trial, these decisions also highlight the Court's recogni-
tion that a capital defense team must do an enormous amount of work
prior to trial in order to be ready to present an effective mitigation de-
fense. The clarity of the Court's decisions has also coincided, whether
directly or indirectly, with a surge in hiring mitigation specialists in capi-
tal public defender offices, as well as with increased training opportuni-
ties for mitigation specialists nationwide. 6 At the same time, the Court's
decisions say nothing about how to conduct a mitigation investigation or
how capital defense attorneys should manage ethical issues and conflict-
ing world views that may arise when the capital defense team is com-
prised of people from interdisciplinary professional backgrounds, which
is often the case when mitigation specialists are professionally trained in
a field other than law. Indeed, mitigation specialists come from a variety
1 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
2 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
3 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
4 In Williams, the Court found that capital trial counsel fell below the "Strickland stan-
dard" when they failed to conduct an extensive mitigation investigation. 529 U.S. at 395-97;
see also infra note 5 and accompanying text for more on the Strickland standard. In Wiggins,
the Court found that capital trial counsel had fallen below the Strickland standard when it
failed to thoroughly investigate Wiggins' social history. 539 U.S. at 526-28. And in
Rompilla, the Court found that counsel's limited mitigation investigation fell below profes-
sional norms. 545 U.S. at 385.
5 See discussion supra note 4; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
694-95 (1984) (holding that in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an accused
must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient that counsel was not functioning as
the kind of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and
(2) prejudice, by showing that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different").
6 See Sean D. O'Brien, When Life Depends on It: Supplementary Guidelines for the
Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 697
(2008) (observing that qualified mitigation specialists are in "great demand" and that the "de-
mand for qualified mitigation specialists exceeds the supply").
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of backgrounds, such as social work, psychology, anthropology, history,
law and journalism. Although mitigation specialists utilize their prior
professional training when they work on capital trial teams, mitigation is
its own profession and is not a subspecialty of any one discipline.
One could view the increasing number of appointments and training
of mitigation specialists on capital defense teams as evidence of an im-
provement in safeguarding the integrity of a capital defendant's constitu-
tional right to a fair trial by ensuring effective assistance of counsel.7 At
the same time, the rise of capital mitigation specialists has not occurred
without the potential to introduce social costs into the capital trial sys-
tem. These costs include the tension an interdisciplinary capital team
experiences when its legal obligations and directives conflict with the
non-legal professional training of some of its team members. Such inter-
nal tensions can in turn impact the effectiveness of the capital defense,
especially if conflicting norms result in a mitigation specialist disagree-
ing with the attorney's directives or compromising client confidentiality
during the mitigation investigation. Moreover, competing ethical norms
and world views may also impact the defendant's family or society at
large, such as when a social-worker-trained mitigation specialist strug-
gles against what she believes to be mandatory reporting requirements
for child abuse-especially when mandatory reporting would detrimen-
tally affect the defense at the sentencing phase of the capital trial.
In the same way that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has not
addressed these and other tensions that mitigation specialists bring to the
death penalty arena, so have legal scholars failed to analyze these ten-
sions. Much of the scholarship relating to capital mitigation specialists
either gears itself toward practitioners 8 or focuses on the use of mitiga-
7 For example, on March 23, 2007, the Arizona Supreme Court Capital Case Task Force
noted that there were 140 pending capital cases in Maricopa County alone, that fourteen of
those pending capital cases did not even have public defenders or first chair defenders assigned
to them, and that the public defender needed more mitigation specialists to staff its pending
caseload. See Minutes, Arizona Supreme Court Capital Case Task Force, Judicial Education
Center, Phoenix, Ariz. (Mar. 23, 2007), available at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/cctf/
Original%2OTask%2OForce/MinO7-03.pdf (last visited May 22, 2009).
8 One of the preeminent scholars and foremost experts in the United States in the field
of capital mitigation is Russell Stetler. Stetler is the national mitigation coordinator for the
federal death penalty projects. From 1995 to 2005, he was the Director of Investigation and
Mitigation for the Capital Defender Office in New York City. He has investigated all aspects
of capital cases, both trial and post-conviction, since 1980. Much of his writing can be found
in past issues of Champion, a magazine published by the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers. See, e.g., Russell Stetler, Capital Cases: Mitigation Investigation: A Duty
that Demands Expert Help but Can't Be Delegated, CHAMPION, Mar. 2007, at 61. For other
examples of articles discussing capital mitigation, see Arlene Bowers Andrews, Social Work
Expert Testimony Regarding Mitigation in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, Soc. WORK, Sept.
1991, at 5; Jesse Cheng, The Capital Ethnography Project, CHAMPION, July 2006, at 53; Cecile
G. Guin et al., From Misery to Mission: Forensic Social Workers on Multidisciplinary Teams,
Soc. WORK, July 2003, at 3; Michael Ogul, Capital Cases: Dealing with Victim Impact Evi-
MITIGATING DEATH
tion information or mitigation specialists during the capital trial itself.9
For example, one strand of scholarship examines the use of social work-
ers testifying as experts in capital sentencing proceedings.10 This schol-
arship focuses on how mitigation information is presented during trial
instead of examining how mitigation evidence is investigated prior to
trial. Another strand of scholarship addresses the role of social workers
in public defenders' offices. " I While providing insight about ethical con-
straints that social workers experience when they are hired to work as
social workers inside public defender offices, this scholarship does not
address the unique issues that arise when social workers serve as mitiga-
tion specialists on capital defense teams.
This Article seeks to fill the void between these two strands of
scholarship. Instead of focusing on the use of social workers as testify-
ing experts during the trial itself, this Article examines the use of social
workers as mitigation consultants during the pre-trial investigative
phase. 12 Similarly, instead of focusing on the general use of social work-
ers in public defender offices, this Article explores the specialized use of
social workers as mitigation specialists on capital defense teams. In sum,
by examining critical issues that arise during the pre-trial investigation
that social-worker-trained mitigation specialists conduct as members of
capital defense teams, this Article explores the inherent complexity that
the Court's mitigation jurisprudence has brought to the death penalty
arena. When the legal ethics and world views of capital defense attor-
neys conflict with the professional ethics and world views of mitigation
specialists working on the capital defense team, such unresolved tensions
dence, CHAMPION, Aug./Sept. 2000, at 42; Julie Schroeder, Forging a New Practice Area:
Social Work's Role in Death Penalty Mitigation Investigations, 84 FAMILiEs IN Soc'y: THE J.
OF CONTEMPORARY HUMAN SERVS. 423 (2003).
9 As an introductory resource to capital mitigation investigation, see generally the June
2008 issue of the Hofstra Law Review, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 663-1093 (2008). While these
articles provide critical depth to the understanding of capital mitigation investigation, they do
not discuss the ethical tensions between law and social work that this Article addresses.
10 See, e.g., Bowers Andrews, supra note 8.
1 1 See, e.g., Jose B. Ashford et al., Advocacy by Social Workers in the Public Defender's
Office, Soc. WORK, May-June 1987, at 3; James L. Scherrer, How Social Workers Help Law-
yers, Soc. WORK, July 1976, at 4.
12 The distinction between a mitigation specialist who serves as a testifying expert at trial
and a mitigation specialist who serves as a consulting member of the capital defense team is
critical. Testifying experts waive protections such as attorney-client privilege and work prod-
uct, whereas non-testifying consultants arguably retain such protections. See Lawrence J. Fox,
Capital Guidelines and Ethical Duties: Mutually Reinforcing Responsibilities, 36 HOFsTRA L.
REV. 775, 802 (2008) (observing that "it is absolutely necessary, in order to preserve these
'vital' privileges and protections, that counsel make the decision whether a consultant will
testify early on, lest he or she be placed in jeopardy of exposing privileged communications or
otherwise non-discoverable information from or about [the] client"); Telephone Interview with
Professor Jose B. Ashford, Dir. of Office of Forensic Soc. Work, Ariz. State Univ., in Phoenix,
Ariz. (July 28, 2008).
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have the potential to negatively impact the constitutional rights of the
capital defendant by compromising the effective assistance of counsel
the defendant receives.' 3
To begin this analysis, Part I explains the historical development of
capital mitigation specialists and the extent to which the Supreme
Court's capital jurisprudence and legal ethics have shaped the role of
mitigation specialists. It analyzes pivotal moments in the Court's early
capital mitigation jurisprudence, and then discusses the role of the Amer-
ican Bar Association's (ABA) Guidelines for the Appointment and Per-
formance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (ABA Guidelines)
in establishing the core duties of mitigation specialists. 14 Part I con-
cludes by discussing three of the Court's recent mitigation cases, Wil-
liams,15 Wiggins,16 and Rompilla,17 and how these cases rely, in part, on
the ABA Guidelines to explain how capital mitigation investigation is a
critical component of a capital defendant's constitutional right to effec-
tive representation of counsel.
Part II discusses the different world views and practice methods that
social workers bring to capital defense teams when they work as mitiga-
tion specialists. It contrasts a social worker's multidimensional, systems-
based approach to a capital defense attorney's linear, diagnostic ap-
proach, concluding that a systems-based approach brings important
depth, perspective, and expertise to the mitigation investigation.
Part III examines some ethical conflicts that capital attorneys and
social-worker-trained mitigation specialists may experience when they
work together on capital defense teams. Beginning with the ABA's
13 See AM. BAR Assoc., GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DE-
FENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 4.1 cmt. (rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter ABA GUIDE-
LINES], available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/
deathpenaltyguidelines2003.pdf ("For all of these reasons the use of mitigation specialists has
become 'part of the existing "standard of care' in capital cases, ensuring 'high quality investi-
gation and preparation of the penalty phase.'" (quoting SUBCOMM. ON FED. DEATH PENALTY
CASES COMM. ON DEFENDER SERVS., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL
DEATH PENALTY CASES: RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE COST AND QUALITY OF DE-
FENSE REPRESENTATION, 24 (1998))); see also discussion infra Part Ill.
14 ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 13. In addition, the American Bar Association Death
Penalty Representation Project recently collaborated with the Public Interest Litigation Clinic
and the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law to supplement the ABA Guide-
lines. See Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death
Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (2008) [hereinafter Supplementary Guidelines]. The
Supplementary Guidelines provide even more detail about the duties of mitigation specialists
and the interaction of mitigation specialists with capital attorneys. See, e.g., id. §§ 4.1-The
Capital Defense Team: The Role of Mitigation Specialists, 5.1-Qualifications of the Defense
Team, 10.4-The Defense Team: The Role of Counsel with Respect to Mitigation Specialists,
10.1 I-The Defense Case: Requisite Mitigation Functions of the Defense Team.
15 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
16 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
17 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
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Model Rules of Professional Conduct,18 it first examines relevant legal
ethics rules. It then examines relevant social work ethics rules by explor-
ing provisions from the National Association of Social Workers' Code of
Ethics.'9 Part III concludes by exploring the importance of recognizing
the ethical tensions social workers experience when they work as mitiga-
tion specialists on capital defense teams. The final section concludes this
Article. By understanding how ethical norms and world views from law
and social work interact, this Article strives to ensure that interdiscipli-
nary capital defense teams anticipate and resolve ethical conflicts in or-
der to safeguard the capital defendant's constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel.
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITAL MITIGATION SPECIALISTS
A. What Capital Mitigation Specialists Do
In contrast to a typical criminal defense team comprised of one or
two attorneys and a fact investigator, a capital defense team is more com-
plex. At a minimum, the ABA's Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (ABA Guide-
lines) observe that such a team must consist of two attorneys (at least one
of whom has extensive experience in death penalty litigation),20 a fact
investigator, and a mitigation specialist.2 ' The ABA Guidelines also in-
dicate that at least one member of the capital defense team must know
how to identify mental health issues that the capital defendant may
have,22 a job that often falls to the mitigation specialist.
Although the ABA Guidelines require the appointment of a mitiga-
tion specialist to the capital defense team, they do not specify the profes-
sional background that mitigation specialists should have. Because no
specific educational background is a prerequisite to becoming a mitiga-
tion specialist, mitigation specialists are drawn from a variety of diverse
professional careers, including prior work as probation officers, private
18 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2008).
19 See NAT'L Assoc. OF SoC. WORKERS, CODE OF ETHICS OF THE NAT'L Assoc. OF Soc.
WORKERS (rev. 1999) [hereinafter NASW CODE OF ETHics], available at http://www.social
workers.org/pubs/code (last visited May 22, 2009).
20 See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 5.1(B), cmt. (detailing specific qualifications
of defense counsel, and also discussing other possible qualifications); id. § 4.1(A)(l); id.
§ 10.4(A) (specifying that at least two attorneys should be assigned to each capital case).
21 See id. §§ 4.1(A)(1), cmt., 10.4(C)(2), cmt.
22 See id. § 10.4(C)(2)(b) (explaining that one member of the defense team must be
"qualified by training and experience to screen individuals for the presence of mental or psy-
chological disorders or impairments"); id. § 4.1 cmt. ("[Mitigation specialists] have the
clinical skills to recognize such things as congenital, mental or neurological conditions, to
understand how these conditions may have affected the defendant's development and behav-
ior, and to identify the most appropriate experts to examine the defendant or testify on his
behalf.").
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investigators, lawyers, psychologists, journalists, anthropologists, and so-
cial workers.2 3 Within the field of social work, "forensic social work" is
an established subspecialty that happens to provide useful building
blocks for skills that would be further developed if the forensic social
worker later decided to enter the field of capital mitigation-such as the
skill of developing social histories.24 While mitigation specialists might
therefore benefit from building on some of the skills acquired through
prior social work training, mitigation is by no means a subspecialty of
either social work or forensic social work. It is a field unto itself. Be-
cause mitigation specialists must be able to explore a wide array of in-
vestigative avenues, no one field provides the sole professional training
for capital mitigation specialists. At the same time, mitigation specialists
who have training in other disciplines-such as social work-bring with
them skills sets, world views, and professional expertise that can be espe-
cially valuable to capital defense teams. 25
Mitigation specialists uncover extensive information about the de-
fendant from the defendant's family, teachers, friends, and almost any-
one who was ever part of the defendant's life. 26 Mitigation specialists
gather this information in order to construct a psycho-social history-or
life story-of the capital defendant. Because often the best defense a
capital attorney can render is to negotiate an agreed-upon disposition,
mitigation evidence might be critical in helping to obtain such a plea
bargain. 27 Alternatively, if the case does proceed to trial, the attorneys
will integrate the mitigation evidence with the overall preparation of the
case, culminating in the presentation of mitigation during the sentencing
phase in order to argue to the jury that a sentence less than death (which
23 Telephone Interview with Danielle Waller, Mitigation Specialist and Licensed Clinical
Social Worker, Mitigation and Sentencing Servs., in Springfield, I11. (June 10, 2009).
24 See Albert R. Roberts & David W. Springer, An Introduction to Forensic Social Work
Perspectives, in SOCIAL WORK IN JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SETTINGS 25, 25 (3d ed.
2007) ("The overriding goal of forensic and justice social work is to improve the quality of life
and deliver mental health and social services to victims and offenders .... The scope of
forensic social work includes a wide range of evidence-based assessment and treatment meth-
ods with crime victims as well as juvenile and adult offenders.").
25 See infra text accompanying notes 118-3 1.
26 For example, the ABA Guidelines recognize that "[m]itigation specialists possess
clinical and information-gathering skills and training that most lawyers simply do not have.
They have the time and the ability to elicit sensitive, embarrassing and often humiliating evi-
dence (e.g., family sexual abuse) that the defendant may have never disclosed." ABA GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 13, § 4.1 cmt.
27 Id. §10.9.1 cmt. ("'Death is different because avoiding execution is, in many capital
cases, the best and only realistic result possible'; as a result, plea bargains in capital cases are
not usually 'offered' but instead must be 'pursued and won.' Agreements are often only possi-
ble after many years of effort. Accordingly, this Guideline emphasizes that the obligation of
counsel to seek an agreed-upon disposition continues throughout all phases of the case." (quot-
ing Kevin McNally, Death Is Different: Your Approach to a Capital Case Must be Different,
Too, CHAMPION, Mar. 1984, at 8, 15)).
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usually means a sentence of life without the possibility of parole) is ap-
propriate. a8 The training that a social worker receives interviewing and
compiling social histories can thus provide useful baseline skills to de-
velop and hone if that person later decides to become a mitigation
specialist.
Indeed, the extensive poverty, neglect, and abuse29 that mitigation
specialists uncover during their investigation of the capital defendant's
life is also something that social workers are trained to understand. The
typical capital defendant has experienced "family poverty and depriva-
tion, childhood neglect, emotional and physical abuse," as well as "insti-
tutional failure and mistreatment in the juvenile and adult correctional
system."' 30 As one social scientist explains, "There is not much glamour
in these stories, not much stylized evil, not much brilliant, diabolical,
deliciously twisted violence. Just a lot of mundane truths about how
deprivation, abuse, neglect, institutional failure and mistreatment, and so
on can all combine to twist a life badly out of shape. '31 Because univer-
sities specially train social workers to work with those people entrenched
in poverty, abuse, and neglect, they are well suited to identifying these
same issues as members of the capital defense team.
Identifying patterns of abuse, poverty, and neglect, then compiling
this information into an extensive psycho-social history of the defendant
is a critical part of the mitigation specialist's job, but it is not the only
task. A typical court affidavit32 offered in support of seeking funding for
a capital mitigation specialist contains many single-spaced pages outlin-
ing different tasks a mitigation specialist must do in order to perform her
28 See Id. § 4.1 cmt. ("Perhaps most critically, having a qualified mitigation specialist
assigned to every capital case as an integral part of the defense team insures that the presenta-
tion ... is integrated into the overall preparation of the case rather than being hurriedly thrown
together by defense counsel still in shock at the guilty verdict.").
29 But cf. Jessie Seyfer & Howard Mintz, Next Peterson Battle: Life Term or Death?
The Defense Will Try to Humanize Him as the Prosecution Tries to Demonize Him, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Nov. 14, 2004, at A16 ("The defense will emphasize every positive aspect of Peter-
son's personality that they can. Usually, defense attorneys ... present testimony about diffi-
cult, abusive childhoods, mental illness or drug addiction ... [but] '[tihis isn't going to be a
usual type of penalty phase .... ').
30 Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of
Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 608 (1995). In 1978, anthropologist Colin Turnbull
issued a "call to arms" to fellow anthropologists that basically went unanswered until research-
ers and mitigation specialists such as Craig Haney picked up the ball more than twenty years
later. See Cheng, supra note 8, at 53-54. Within the last fifteen years, Haney and others have
dedicated much attention to understanding the complex life stories-the "social histories"--of
capital defendants. Their work strives to more thoroughly document the social histories of
capital defendants and what part their families played or did not play in the capital defendants'
lives.
31 See Haney, supra note 30.
32 A sample affidavit in support of seeking funding for a capital mitigation specialist is
on file with the author [hereinafter Mitigation Affidavit].
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job competently. According to the ABA Guidelines, some of these du-
ties should include ensuring that the mitigation specialist
compiles a comprehensive and well-documented
psycho-social history of the client based on an exhaus-
tive investigation; analyzes the significance of the infor-
mation in terms of impact on development, including
effect on personality and behavior; finds mitigating
themes in the client's life history; identifies the need for
expert assistance; assists in locating appropriate experts;
provides social history information to experts to enable
them to conduct competent and reliable evaluations; and
works with the defense team and experts to develop a
comprehensive and cohesive case in mitigation.33
In essence, the ABA Guidelines require mitigation specialists to
know virtually everything there is to know about the defendant, his fam-
ily, his friends, his employers, and even his nemeses-contemporarily (at
the time of the crime and post-crime) and historically (going as far back
as possible through generations of the defendant's descendants). 34 Such
investigation includes detailed information about the defendant's own
childhood as well as intergenerational investigations of the defendant's
family. It may also include exposure to environmental pollutants such as
lead poisoning or asbestos.
While fulfilling all of the above tasks and more, capital mitigation
specialists keep track of their hours and bill their time just like any other
member of the defense team. Capital mitigation specialists employed
full-time through state or federal capital defender offices do not need to
seek appointment in individual cases. In contrast, court-appointed attor-
neys (who may have been assigned to a capital case to resolve a conflict
with the capital defender office, because of multiple co-defendants, or
because the jurisdiction does not have a capital defender office) must
seek court-approved funding to hire private capital mitigation specialists.
In the years before the ABA Guidelines and recent Supreme Court juris-
prudence expressly endorsing the work of capital mitigation specialists, 35
such funding was more difficult to receive than it is now. 36
33 ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 4.1 cmt.; see also Supplementary Guidelines,
supra note 14, § 4.1.
34 See Mitigation Affidavit, supra note 32; Stetler, supra note 8, at 63.
35 See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
36 While it is true that some courts remain reluctant to fund capital mitigation specialists,
what is more widely true is the extent to which capital mitigation specialists must continue to
educate the court (and sometimes even the capital defense attorneys for whom they work)
about the full investigative latitude and comprehensive funding they need in order to perform
their jobs effectively. That is where a detailed affidavit painstakingly listing the various kinds
of investigation mitigation specialists must undertake comes into play. It is one step for a
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The Supreme Court's recent mitigation jurisprudence has clarified
the mitigation specialist's role in safeguarding the defendant's right to
effective assistance of counsel, which in turn helps to explain the critical
role that mitigation specialists serve on capital defense teams. The next
section highlights some pivotal moments in the Court's jurisprudence
that underscore the connection between extensive mitigation investiga-
tion and effective assistance of counsel.
B. The Supreme Court's Capital Mitigation Jurisprudence
One of the reasons that social science researchers have had such
rich data with which to describe the psycho-social histories of capital
defendants is because of the thorough mitigation investigation that they
have been doing on the ground, in courtrooms, and in public defenders'
offices across the country, well before the mid 1990s. Indeed, what one
might call the "birth" of capital mitigation specialists began in the early
1970s, coinciding with the Supreme Court's historic Furman v. Georgia
decision dismantling all existing death penalty statutes and the post-
Furman cases examining whether revised death penalty statutes that state
legislatures passed in the wake of Furman remedied the constitutional
infirmities that Furman had identified. 37
1. The Supreme Court's Early Cases: 1970-1989
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court dismantled all existing
death penalty statutes through Furman v. Georgia.38 In light of Furman,
states were forced to examine their death penalty procedures before re-
turning to the business of capital prosecution. They did so in quick or-
der, and the resulting post-Furman cases forced the Court to examine
whether new procedures passed constitutional muster. Through cases
such as Woodson v. North Carolina in 197639 and Lockett v. Ohio in
1978,40 the Supreme Court underscored the great weight it placed on
particularized consideration of mitigation evidence, going so far as to
mandate that capital jurors must be allowed to consider "any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the of-
fense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
court to agree to fund a mitigation specialist for a given case; it is sometimes another step
altogether for a court to approve the extensive expenses that competent mitigation investiga-
tion involves. Telephone Interview with Danielle Waller, Mitigation Specialist and Licensed
Clinical Social Worker, Mitigation and Sentencing Servs., in Springfield, Ill. (June 10, 2009);
see also O'Brien, supra note 6, at 698 (reporting that "every jurisdiction in the United States
that authorizes the death penalty has a mechanism to provide mitigation specialist services").
37 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
38 Id.
39 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
40 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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death."'4 ' While not requiring capital defense attorneys to investigate
every aspect of the capital defendant's life, the mandate that jurors must
be allowed to consider any aspect of the defendant's life implicitly sig-
naled that capital defense attorneys could (and should) broaden their ar-
eas of inquiry.
Although these early decisions recognized that relevant mitigation
evidence could be extremely broad,42 such recognition did not translate
into immediate on-the-ground changes. It took capital defense teams
some time to realize the full potential of the Court's jurisprudence. As
one scholar remarked, even though the Court had signaled that mitigation
evidence could be extremely varied and far reaching, capital defense
teams "were largely at a loss to figure out what to do with their new-
found freedom."'43 Because attorneys were used to judges constraining
their mitigation evidence to that which addressed specific factors listed in
state statutory schemes, 44 attorneys needed time to brainstorm new ways
to present mitigation evidence now that they could litigate outside the list
of statutory mitigating factors. 45
Despite the fact that defense attorneys needed time to envision new
ways to present mitigation evidence, the Court continued to encourage
outside-the-box thinking through such cases as Skipper v. South Caro-
lina, where the Court emphasized that a jury could consider any evidence
offered in mitigation, whether or not a statute specified it, and even if the
41 Id. at 604.
42 See, e.g., Stetler, supra note 8, at 61 (explaining that Woodson "captured the breadth
of potential mitigating evidence by referring simply to the 'diverse frailties of humankind"').
43 See Cheng, supra note 8.
44 An example of current statutory mitigating factors includes:
(1) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; (2) the murder
was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution;
(3) the murdered individual was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct
or consented to the homicidal act; (4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of
threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm; (5) the
defendant was not personally present during commission of the act or acts causing
death.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 2008).
45 While capital defense attorneys in the 1980s were beginning to brainstorm new kinds
of mitigation evidence, victims' rights programs-many of which were housed in and devel-
oped through state district attorney offices-were pushing for expanded aggravation evidence.
In contrast to the Court's commitment to increasing the breadth of mitigation evidence, and
despite the increasing strength of victims' rights programs, the Supreme Court did not immedi-
ately endorse such efforts. In 1987, the Court created a per se bar to victim impact evidence.
See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). In 1989, the Court prohibited prosecutors from
arguing about the victim impact of a crime. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805
(1989). Thus, at the same time that the Court was keeping close reins on victim impact evi-
dence in aggravation, it was also expanding the breadth of mitigation evidence.
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evidence happened after the crime had taken place (such as good conduct
in jail after being arrested for a capital offense). 46
2. Enter the ABA Guidelines: 1989-1999
As the Court continued to loosen the reins on admissible mitigation
evidence, the American Bar Association entered the discussion by offer-
ing additional guidance to capital defense attorneys. In 1989, the ABA
adopted its first Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (1989 ABA Guidelines).47 Although
the ABA had previously adopted positions on "the effective assistance of
counsel in capital cases," 48 the 1989 ABA Guidelines formalized and
expanded upon its previous positions. While the 1989 ABA Guidelines
offered numerous suggestions, most relevant for the purposes of this Ar-
ticle is the extent to which the 1989 ABA Guidelines specified sources of
information that trial counsel should investigate in order to prepare for
the sentencing phase of a capital trial. 49 According to the 1989 ABA
Guidelines, such investigation should include "efforts to discover all rea-
sonably available mitigating evidence."50 In other words, in addition to
the usual suspects in discovery (such as charging documents, talking
with one's client, and examining the client's mental state), 51 the 1989
ABA Guidelines suggested more novel sources for mitigation
investigation.
Not only did the 1989 ABA Guidelines' specificity serve as a
checklist for defense attorneys trying to conceptualize new ways to ap-
proach mitigation investigation, but it also spoke to judges reluctant to
concede that such evidence was now admissible in capital sentencing
proceedings. For example, the 1989 ABA Guidelines explained that in-
vestigating a client's "medical history" should include investigating pos-
sible "birth trauma and developmental delays," 52 that "family and social
history" investigations should include looking into "physical, sexual, or
emotional abuse," 53 that "religious and cultural influences" 54 were rele-
vant, and that it was important to interview "potential witnesses" who
knew "aspects of the client's life history" that were relevant to "other
mitigating evidence to show why the client should not be sentenced to
46 476 U.S. 1, 4-9 (1986).
47 AM. BAR Assoc., ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (1989) [hereinafter 1989 ABA GUIDELINES], available at
http://www.abanet.org/deathpenalty/resources/docs/1989Guidelines.pdf.
48 See id. Introduction.
49 See id. Guideline 11.4.1.
50 Id. Guideline 11.4.1(C).
51 Id. Guideline 11.4.1(1), (2).
52 Id. Guideline 11.4.1(2)(C).
53 Id.
54 Id.
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death." 55 Such sweeping breadth of mitigation was unheard of before
cases like Woodson, Lockett, and Skipper. By the late 1980s, the ABA
hoped its 1989 ABA Guidelines would ensure that such breadth was the
norm.
Against this increasing breadth of mitigation evidence throughout
the late 1980s, it is perhaps no surprise that by the early 1990s, the Court
began to signal a willingness to begin pulling in the reins (however
slightly) on capital mitigation evidence. Starting with Saffle v. Parks in
1990, the Court made clear that even though the range of potential miti-
gation evidence was virtually infinite, some limitations did exist.56 The
Parks decision amplified the Court's 1987 holding from California v.
Brown,57 wherein the Court upheld the constitutionality of a capital jury
instruction that told a jury not to be "swayed by 'mere sentiment, conjec-
ture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling"' 58
during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. This meant that even
though Woodson and Lockett had said that jurors must be allowed to
consider "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death," 59 any aspect did not actually mean any evi-
dence: evidence intended only to appeal to a jury's sympathy or passions
was excluded.
One year later, the Court took an even more decisive step in Payne
v. Tennessee when it observed that the scales in capital trials had become
"unfairly weighted."'60 The Court recognized that "while virtually no
limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant
may introduce concerning his own circumstances," 61 the Court's juris-
prudence had effectively "barred [the State] from either offering 'a quick
glimpse of the life' which a defendant 'chose to extinguish,' . . . or dem-
onstrating the loss to the victim's family and to society which has re-
sulted from the defendant's homicide." 62 To "'keep the balance true"' 63
55 Id. Guideline 11.4.1(3), (3)(B).
56 See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 487-90 (1990).
57 479 U.S. 538 (1987) (decided after Parks' conviction became final in 1983). Although
the Parks holding did not add any additional constraints and simply repeated an earlier holding
from California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987), the fact that the Court took pains to amplify
this holding was an early indication of its desire to scale back the "no-holds-barred" mentality
of capital sentencing.
58 Saffle, 494 U.S. at 493 (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. at 542).
59 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
60 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991).
61 Id.
62 Id. (citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
The Court contextualized this statement by explaining that Booth had been misinterpreted:
"The language quoted from Woodson in the Booth opinion was not intended to describe a class
of evidence that could not be received, but a class of evidence which must be received." Id.
63 Id. at 827 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934)).
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between the State and the capital defendant, the Court held "that if the
State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and
prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no
per se bar."64 Some scholars have interpreted this language to mean that
a state must proactively choose whether to permit the introduction of
victim impact evidence by codifying it in a state death penalty statute.65
Other scholars have used the "circumstances of the capital crime" statu-
tory catchall phrase to justify the admission of victim impact evidence
when such evidence has not been expressly codified in the state statute.66
While most states have relied on one of these two interpretations to allow
victim impact evidence to be admitted at every capital trial, 67 a few states
have held out against either interpretation, enacting state statutes ex-
pressly forbidding the admission of victim impact evidence if "it is not
directly related to the circumstances of the offense or necessary for re-
buttal." 68 Whatever the interpretation any one particular jurisdiction
adopted, the overall impact was clear: Payne resulted in the admission of
victim impact evidence-in some capacity-at virtually every capital
trial thereafter, and that victim impact evidence began a direct tug-of-war
with mitigation evidence. 69
Such was the posture in the early 1990s. With Payne paving the
way for victim impact evidence 70 and with "virtually no limits"' 7' on ad-
missible mitigation evidence, the 1990s set the stage for intense sentenc-
ing hearings in the capital courtroom. Although the Court had taken
pains to restrict counsel from appealing to juries through "'mere senti-
ment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public
feeling," 72 practically speaking, such prohibition did not do much to
alter the temperament of the capital courtroom. With judges reluctant to
cede any potentially reversible grounds to defense counsel, and with the
Court's "virtually no limits" capital mitigation jurisprudence firmly in
64 Id.
65 See Michael Ogul, Capital Cases: Dealing with Victim Impact Evidence (Part 1),
CHAMPION, June 2000, at 43.
66 See id. at 44.
67 See id. at 43-44.
68 Id. at 44 (citing Smith v. Texas, 919 S.W.2d 96, 102 (Tex. 1996)).
69 See Payne, 501 U.S. 808.
70 At the same time that Payne established this precedent, victims' rights groups were
also increasing their pressure to be heard. For exampleby 1993, a total of fourteen states had
ratified constitutional amendments for victims' rights; by 1996, twenty-nine states had ratified
such amendments. See Nat'l Ctr. for Victims of Crime, Crime Victims' Rights in America: An
Historical Overview, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/ncvrw/1999/histr.htm (last visited May 22,
2009).
71 Payne, 501 U.S. at 822 (citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting)).
72 Saffle v. Parks 494 U.S. 484, 493(1990) (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,
542 (1987)).
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place, judges wishing to err on the side of caution (by limiting the errors
defense counsel could later cite on appeal) continued to allow capital
defendants to introduce and to argue a wide range of mitigation evidence
to the jury.
Capital trials in the 1990s thus unfolded in high gear. Capital de-
fense offices began hiring full-time mitigation specialists to help safe-
guard the rights of capital defendants by more thoroughly investigating
and presenting effective mitigation evidence at the sentencing phase of
capital trials.73 Throughout the remainder of the 1990s, the Court stayed
largely out of fray, but by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the
Court was ready to intervene again.
3. The Williams-Wiggins-Rompilla Triad: 2000-Present
Starting with Williams v. Taylor in 2000,7 4 and then continuing with
Wiggins v. Smith in 200375 and Rompilla v. Beard in 2005,76 the Court
launched a series of decisions emphasizing the importance of thorough
mitigation investigation in capital defense cases. In Williams, the Court
found that capital trial counsel failed to meet the "Strickland standard" 77
when trial counsel "did not begin to prepare for [the mitigation] phase of
the [capital sentencing] proceeding until a week before the trial" 78 and
when "they failed to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered
extensive records graphically describing Williams' nightmarish child-
hood, not because of any strategic calculation but because they incor-
rectly thought that state law barred access to such records. ' 79 Instead of
conducting mitigation investigation and preparing for the sentencing
phase of the capital trial, Williams' defense attorneys stressed in their
closing argument to the jury that Williams had turned himself over to the
authorities. 80 Indeed, the death of Harris Stone, for which Williams was
eventually convicted and sentenced to death, was not even under investi-
gation when Williams sent authorities a note implicating himself as
Stone's murderer.8' Local authorities had concluded that the cause of
73 At the same time as capital defender offices began hiring full-time mitigation special-
ists, victims' rights offices continued to proliferate, thereby exerting increasing pressure on
prosecutors' offices to find new and better ways to protect the rights of capital victims' fami-
lies. See, e.g., John W. Stickels, Victim Impact Evidence: The Victims' Right That Influences
Criminal Trials, 32 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 231, 235-46 (2001) (explaining how victims' rights
expanded and the "evolution of the victim's right to participate at punishment hearings").
74 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
75 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
76 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
77 See supra note 5 and accompanying text for a description of the Strickland Standard.
78 Williams, 529 U.S. at 395.
79 id.
80 See id. at 369.
8 1 Williams was incarcerated at the city jail on an unrelated offense when he wrote an
anonymous letter to police confessing that he had "killed 'that man down on Henry Street."'
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Stone's death was alcohol poisoning and closed the case, but they re-
opened it and charged Williams for capital murder after receiving his
confession note.82
In evaluating Williams' post-conviction ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim, the Court focused on what trial counsel did and failed to
do in preparation for the capital sentencing phase.83 While recognizing
that "not all of the additional evidence [that trial counsel did not investi-
gate and therefore did not know about] was favorable to Williams,"84 the
Court underscored that the "failure to introduce the comparatively volu-
minous amount of evidence that did speak in Williams' favor was not
justified by a tactical decision to focus on Williams' voluntary confes-
sion."'85 The Court also stressed that trial counsel's omissions in investi-
gation "clearly demonstrate that trial counsel did not fulfill their
obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's back-
ground."'86 In support of the defense attorneys' failure of their obligation
to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background, the
Court cited the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice and its supporting
commentary to emphasize capital counsel's critical responsibility to
Id. at 367. The police quickly determined that Williams had written the note, in part because
the note contained a reference to the unit of the local jail in which Williams was housed (the
"I" unit). See id. In addition to confessing to the Stone murder, Williams' note also confessed
to other acts. See id. at 368 (referencing the "brutal" assault of an elderly woman who was
rendered to a vegetative state and was not likely to recover). As soon as the police determined
that Williams had authored the note, the police interrogated him about the murder and the
other acts to which he had confessed and obtained several statements. See id. at 367-68. The
State eventually used Williams' statements against him in aggravation at his capital trial. See
id.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 367-74 (describing the limited evidence introduced during the sentencing
phase of the trial and what was argued during state and federal habeas proceedings).
84 Id. at 396 (explaining that "juvenile records revealed that he had been thrice commit-
ted to the juvenile system-for aiding and abetting larceny when he was 11 years old, for
pulling a false fire alarm when he was 12, and for breaking and entering when he was 15").
85 Id. Some of the evidence that the state trial judge (who had presided over Williams'
trial and sentencing)-and eventually the United States Supreme Court-found to be "signifi-
cant mitigating evidence" that trial counsel had failed to present included "documents prepared
in connection with Williams' commitment when he was 11 years old that dramatically de-
scribed mistreatment, abuse, and neglect during his early childhood, as well as testimony that
he was 'borderline mentally retarded,' had suffered repeated head injuries, and might have
mental impairments organic in origin." Id. at 370-71, 395-96. In addition, the Court ob-
served in a footnote that juvenile records documenting why Williams' parents had been im-
prisoned for the criminal neglect of Williams contained descriptions of a home that was such a
"complete wreck" that "there were several places on the floor where someone had had a bowel
movement," that the parents were "so intoxicated, they could not find any clothes for the
children" (who were "all dirty and none of them had on under-pants") and that some of the
children themselves were "under the influence of whiskey" at the time they were removed
from the house and placed in a hospital. Id. at 395 n.19 (citation omitted).
86 Id. at 396.
20091
354 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18:337
complete a thorough investigation of the psycho-social history of the
defendant. 87
The coupling of Supreme Court jurisprudence with ABA ethical
guidelines continued three years later in Wiggins v. Smith, 88 when the
Court found that Kevin Wiggins' capital trial counsel had fallen below
the Strickland 9 standard because trial counsel had failed to thoroughly
investigate Wiggins' social history.90 The trial court found that Wiggins
had drowned a seventy-seven-year-old woman in her bathtub. 9t His at-
torneys tried the case before a state judge who convicted Wiggins of
"first-degree murder, robbery, and two counts of theft." 92 Following the
conviction, Wiggins elected to try the sentencing portion of his capital
case before a jury, and his attorneys filed a motion to bifurcate that sen-
tencing proceeding into two phases. During the first phase of the bifur-
cated sentencing proceeding, his attorneys sought to argue that Wiggins
was not eligible to receive the death penalty because he was not directly
responsible for the killing (i.e., he was not a "principal in the first de-
gree"). 93 If the defense attorneys won the first phase, the case would not
proceed to a second phase because Wiggins would not be death-eligible.
If, however, the defense lost the first phase and the case proceeded to the
second phase, his attorneys intended to introduce mitigating evidence. 94
The Court denied the motion and Wiggins' attorneys "decided to focus
their efforts on 'retry[ing] the factual case' and disputing Wiggins' direct
responsibility for the murder."95 His attorneys introduced no mitigating
evidence describing Wiggins' life history, even though their opening
statement to the jury at the sentencing phase promised the jury such
evidence. 96
In finding that Wiggins' trial attorneys' investigation "fell short of
the professional standards that prevailed in Maryland in 1989, ''97 the
Court noted that "standard practice in Maryland in capital cases at the
time of Wiggins' trial included the preparation of a social history re-
port," 98 and that the Public Defender's office provided funding to retain a
87 Id. (citing I AM. BAR Assoc., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 4-4.1 cmt.
(2d ed. 1980)).
88 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
89 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692-94 (1984); see also supra note 5 and
accompanying text for a description of the Strickland standard.
90 See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534-38.
91 See id. at 514-15.
92 Id.
93 See id. at 515.
94 See id.
95 Id. at 517.
96 See id. at 515.
97 Id. at 524.
98 Id.
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mitigation specialist to help prepare such a report. 99 Despite the ease
with which his attorneys could have prepared such a report, they chose
not to do so. 100 Rather than attributing this decision to tactical strategy,
however, the Court amplified the "unreasonableness" of the decision 1'
by comparing it to the same professional norms it had cited in Wil-
liams-the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice-as well as to the
1989 ABA Guidelines.10 2 After highlighting how Wiggins' attorneys'
performance fell below both the ABA's and the state of Maryland's pro-
fessional norms, the Court agreed with the federal district court's finding
that "any reasonably competent attorney would have realized that pursu-
ing [the few leads trial counsel did uncover] was necessary to making an
informed choice among possible defenses."' 0 3 In sum, it was impossible
for Wiggins' attorneys to make a tactical decision to limit their mitiga-
tion investigation when they did not even do enough investigation to
make strategic decisions about what to leave out.
The Court emphasized the critical importance of thorough capital
mitigation investigation-as well as the Court's reliance on ABA ethical
guidelines to define the outer limits of professional capital norms-in
Rompilla,10 4 just two years after Wiggins. Unlike counsel in Williams'0 5
and Wiggins,10 6 the Court noted that Ronald Rompilla's situation was
"not a case in which defense counsel simply ignored their obligation to
find mitigating evidence." 107 Indeed, the Court emphasized that counsel
made "a number of efforts"108 to find mitigating evidence, including "in-
terviews with Rompilla and members of his family, and examinations of
reports by three mental health experts who gave opinions at the guilt
phase."' 0 9 Nonetheless, the Court found that counsel's limited investiga-
tion fell below professional norms because counsel had failed to examine
99 Id.
100 See id.
101 The Court stated that the "record of the actual sentencing proceedings underscores the
unreasonableness of counsel's conduct by suggesting that their failure to investigate thor-
oughly resulted from inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment." Id. at 526.
102 See id. at 524-25 (citing I AM. BAR Assoc., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
§§ 4-4.1 cmt. (2d ed. 1982)); 1989 ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 47, Guideline 11.4.1(C)
(explaining that investigations into mitigating evidence "should comprise efforts to discover
all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence
that may be introduced by the prosecutor" (emphasis added)).
103 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.
104 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
105 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 395 (noting that counsel did not even begin to prepare
for the sentencing phase until one week before trial).
106 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (noting that counsel failed to commission a social history
report "despite the fact that the Public Defender's office made funds available for the retention
of a forensic social worker" to complete such a report).
107 Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381.
108 Id.
109 Id.
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a court file containing information relating to a prior conviction that the
Commonwealth intended to introduce as an aggravating factor at the sen-
tencing phase. 0 The Court explained that counsel would have discov-
ered "any mitigating evidence the Commonwealth would downplay, and
[would have anticipated] the details of the aggravating evidence the
Commonwealth would emphasize" if counsel had examined the file.lII
In finding that counsel's performance fell below professional norms, the
Court cited the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice1 2 as well as the
1989 ABA Guidelines.113 The Court emphasized its reliance on the
ABA Standards when it stated that it "long [had] referred [to these ABA
Standards] as 'guides to determining what is reasonable.'"114
In addition to not looking at the critical file relating to the prior
conviction that the Commonwealth intended to use in aggravation, the
Court also noted that although counsel had conducted some mitigation
investigation, it had failed to investigate a "number of likely avenues" to
build a mitigation case, such as failing to examine school records, failing
to examine records related to his prior juvenile and adult incarcerations,
and failing to look for evidence of a history of alcohol dependence that
1 10 See id. at 383.
1 1 Id. at 385, 386.
112 Id. at 387. The Court cited ABA Standards for Criminal Justice §§ 4-4.1 in the text of
the opinion because that was the standard that was applicable at the time of Rompilla's trial:
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of
the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case
and the penalty in the event of conviction. The investigation should always include
efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforce-
ment authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admis-
sions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated
desire to plead guilty.
AM. BAR Assoc., I ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.). In
a footnote following this citation, the Court then noted that "the new version of the Standards
now reads that any 'investigation should include efforts to secure information in the possession
of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities,' whereas the version in effect at the time
of Rompilla's trial provided that the 'investigation' should always include such efforts.'"
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387 n.6 (citing AM. BAR Assoc., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993)). The Court
then noted that it sees "no material difference between these two phrasings, and in any case
cannot think of any situation in which defense counsel should not make some effort to learn
the information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities." Id.
113 Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387 n.7. The Court also explained how the 1989 ABA Guide-
lines, "applied ... clear requirements for investigation set forth in the earlier Standards," and
how the 2003 ABA Guidelines made "even more explicit" that "'[c]ounsel must ... investi-
gate prior convictions ... that could be used as aggravating circumstances or otherwise come
into evidence. If a prior conviction is legally flawed, counsel should seek to have it set aside.
Counsel may also find extenuating circumstances that can be offered to lessen the weight of a
conviction."' Id. (quoting ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, Guideline 10.7 cmt.). The Court
also emphasized that its "decision in Wiggins made precisely the same point in citing the
earlier 1989 ABA Guidelines." Id.
114 Id. at 387.
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"might have extenuating significance." ' 1 5 Although the Court did not
rest its failure-to-investigate finding on the failure to investigate these
avenues because the failure to investigate the prior conviction file was
dispositive, 116 the Court never went so far as to say that failure to investi-
gate these other avenues would have met existing professional norms.
And while the Court acknowledged that "the duty to investigate does not
force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance something
will turn up,"' 117 it did not venture an opinion as to how it would have
ruled about the failure to investigate these other avenues had counsel not
failed to look at the critical court file.
In sum, the Court interweaves mitigation jurisprudence with the
ABA Guidelines to establish baseline professional norms that capital trial
counsel must meet in order to render effective assistance of counsel.
While clarifying how important thorough capital mitigation investigation
is to safeguarding the constitutional rights of the capital defendant,
neither the Court's opinions nor the ABA Guidelines discuss how such
investigations might impact people beyond the capital defendant. For
example, they do not discuss how mitigation investigation might impact
the defendant's family, whose deeply personal information is often under
intense scrutiny during the investigation. Nor do they discuss how capi-
tal mitigation investigation might impact society at large.
Because the Court's mitigation jurisprudence and the ABA Guide-
lines focus on protecting the constitutional rights of the capital defen-
dant, it is no surprise that they focus on the capital defendant himself. At
the same time, a capital mitigation investigation reaches beyond the capi-
tal defendant by intimately scrutinizing and involving family members
and society at large. In this way, the Rompilla Court could be read to
treat the defendant's family and society at large as objects to be investi-
gated rather than as subjects with independent needs. The social costs
resulting from such objectification are necessary to protect a capital de-
fendant's right to effective assistance of counsel even if this objectifica-
tion goes largely unexamined.
I. COMPLEMENTARY WORLD VISIONS
The preceding section explored how the kinds of skills that a person
with social work training brings to the capital defense team are essential
to help conduct the kind of extensive mitigation investigation that the
Court's jurisprudence requires. In addition to the skills that social work-
ers learn during their education and training, the world visions that corre-
115 Id. at 382.
116 See id. at 383.
117 Id. (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 525 (2003)).
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spond with their professional skills are also an essential attribute they
bring to the capital team.
One way to understand how social workers' world views comple-
ment attorneys' world views is to explore how "social workers focus on
persons-and-environment in interaction."'1 8 Because social workers try
to understand a person in his environment,' 19 they engage in theories and
systems-based practice methods that help them understand both the soci-
etal and individual components of the interaction between people and
their environment. 20
... [I]n analyzing the causes of problems and in identi-
fying targets for change, social workers investigate a
range of conditions, from social factors such as poverty,
discrimination, and educational and employment oppor-
tunities, to individual factors of motivation such as ca-
pacity, behavior, history, and family relationships ...
Both in the ways they understand situations and in the
interventions they select, social workers focus on the in-
terrelationship between the individual and the environ-
ment, whether it be the immediate environment of the
community or the larger society of which we are all a
part. [They have an] attention to multiple causality and
multiple ways of addressing situations .... 121
In contrast to a social worker's attention to persons in their environ-
ment and their multidimensional, systems-based assessment, an attorney
is often trained to employ more of a linear diagnostic approach to solving
issues. For example, instead of exploring the interaction between the
criminal defendant and his environment, an attorney is trained to analyze
the elements of the offense with which the defendant is charged, then to
examine how the facts of the case help to prove or disprove the elements
of the offense. 22 Capital defense attorneys may therefore need team
members who will help them break out of their linear, deductive reason-
ing and understand their client (and their client's case) from a mul-
tidimensional, systems-based perspective, because the range of evidence
an attorney must investigate in preparation for defending a client charged
with a capital crime is so unlike the evidence an attorney prepares for a
1 18 Frank P. Cervone & Linda M. Mauro, Response to the Conference: Ethics, Cultures,
and Professions in the Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975, 1976 (1996)
(quoting Working Statement on the Purpose of Social Work, in Anne Minahin, Introduction to
Special Issue: Purpose and Objectives of Social Work Revisited, Soc. WORK, Jan. 1981, at 5,
6)).
119 Id.
120 See id. at 1977
121 Id.
122 See id. at 1977-78.
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non-capital murder case. When social workers bring such vision to the
team, they may contribute an essential counterweight to the attorneys'
linear, deductive reasoning.
In addition to a systems-based perspective, social workers' profes-
sional experience interacting with families in environments is also im-
portant to their success as mitigation specialists. 123 Through their social
work education, they learned skills that enable them to interview family
members about highly sensitive information. Those skills do not exist in
a theory-less vacuum, but are instead incorporated into a world vision
that respects the dignity and worth of the person being interviewed and
strives to maintain ethical principles throughout the interview.' 24 In this
way, the participation of social workers on capital mitigation teams does
more than simply serve as a counterweight to attorneys' linear and de-
ductive reasoning; their participation could also act as a counterweight to
lessen the objectification of clients' family members that might other-
wise occur during preparation for a capital trial. In other words, the par-
ticipation of social workers on capital mitigation teams could help to
counteract the degree to which the Court's capital jurisprudence has
tended to relegate the capital defendant's family to "object" status-as
things to be investigated, rather than subjects with independent needs. A
social worker's training in respecting family dynamics and individual
dignity may help to lessen the degree to which the client's family mem-
bers are objectified, while also staying within appropriate legal
constraints.
At the same time, a social worker's world vision of respecting the
dignity and worth of the person might also bring tension to the capital
team. For example, if a social worker consulting as a mitigation special-
ist tries to ensure that members of the defendant's family are approached
as subjects with needs rather than as objects possessing information, this
world view contrasts against the attorneys' vision of the capital defen-
dant as the one and only person whose needs the capital defense team
must protect. The resulting clash of world views can bring depth to the
capital trial team but it can also promote tension, especially when the
mitigation specialist is a social worker, and the act of objectifying a cli-
ent's family members competes directly with a social worker's ethics and
world views.
Although the Court's mitigation jurisprudence has emphasized the
broad reach of mitigation investigation and the importance of mitigation
specialists, 25 the Court has not recognized that the objectification its
123 See NASW CODE OF ETHics, supra note 19, Preamble; see also infra Part III.
124 See id., Preamble and Purpose of the NASW Code of Ethics.
125 See discussion supra Part I.B.
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cases implicitly endorse might cause tension within the capital team.' 26
Mitigation specialists trained as social workers learn to follow ethical
standards that might be in direct tension with the attorneys' ethical
norms-such as promoting the well-being and needs of family members
with whom the mitigation specialist is working 127 rather than relegating
the family members to object status and thereby ignoring their needs.' 28
Similarly, even if a social-worker-trained mitigation specialist agrees that
the mitigation specialists' vision and ethics must cede to legal ethics, 129
social workers could still contribute to the objectification of the capital
defendant's family by virtue of simply being part of the system.
Given the objectification that the Court's own jurisprudence pro-
motes, it is striking that the National Association of Social Workers has
not followed the lead of the American Bar Association by issuing supple-
mental guidelines to resolve the tension that may result when capital de-
fense teams are composed of persons trained in non-legal professions,
such as social work.' 30 Compounding this tension between law and so-
cial work is the possibility that one of the mitigation specialist's primary
126 See id. Although the ABA Guidelines do not expressly recognize such ethical ten-
sions, the Supplementary Guidelines clarify that non-lawyers on the defense team are "agents
of defense counsel." See Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 14, Guideline 4. 1 (C) (finding
agents "bound by rules of professional responsibility that govern the conduct of counsel").
This clarification does not recognize the inherent tension social workers on a capital defense
team might experience reconciling their social work ethics and world vision with those of the
attorney, but it does clarify the defense attorney's expectations from a legal ethics standpoint.
Id.
127 See NASW CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 19, § 1.01. This reinforces the ethical princi-
ple that "[slocial workers respect the inherent dignity and worth of the person," which means
that "[s]ocial workers treat each person in a caring and respectful fashion" and "promote cli-
ents' socially responsible self-determination." Id. Ethical Principles. Moreover, "[s]ocial
workers seek to enhance clients' capacity and opportunity to change and to address their own
needs" and "are cognizant of their dual responsibility to clients and to the broader society." Id.
In addition, "[t]hey seek to resolve conflicts between clients' interests and the broader soci-
ety's interests in a socially responsible manner consistent with the values, ethical principles,
and ethical standards of the profession." Id.
128 See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 2.1 cmt.; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.6(a) (2008) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order
to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b)."); see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3(b) ("[A] lawyer having direct supervisory authority
over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is com-
patible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.").
Note that the ABA Guidelines find that "[i]t is essential that both full-time defenders and
assigned counsel be fully independent, free to act on behalf of their clients as dictated by their
best professional judgment. A system that does not guarantee the integrity of the professional
relation is fundamentally deficient in that it fails to provide counsel who have the same free-
dom of action as the lawyer whom the person with sufficient means can afford to retain."
ABA GUIDELrNES, supra note 13, § 2.1 cmt.
129 Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 14, Guideline 4.1(C).
130 See supra, notes 14 and 129 (discussing Supplementary Guidelines, Guideline 4.1 (C)).
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responsibilities-developing a close rapport with the family' 3 '-may ul-
timately heighten the ethical tension a specialist experiences when learn-
ing information (such as sexual, physical, or drug abuse) that legal ethics
rules prevent the specialist from disclosing or treating.
III. ETHICAL TENSIONS BETWEEN LAW AND SOCIAL WORK
The Court's decisions and the ABA Guidelines have made clear that
extensive pre-trial mitigation investigation is critical to the capital defen-
dant's ability to receive effective assistance of counsel. 132 Their en-
dorsement of capital mitigation investigation has coincided, either
directly or indirectly, with a dramatic increase in demand; when jurisdic-
tions prosecute capital cases, the appointment of a mitigation specialist to
the capital defense team is now a necessity instead of a luxury. 133 Coin-
ciding with the Court's and the ABA's strong endorsements of capital
mitigation specialists-as well as the marked increase of the number of
capital cases prosecuted each year in some jurisdictions-is that capital
defender offices have experienced a heightened need to hire and train
new capital mitigation specialists to assist with pending capital cases.' 34
To better understand the ethical constraints that social workers face as
capital mitigation specialists, Section A explores the relationship be-
131 See, e.g., ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, Guideline 4.1(B) cmt. (noting that the
mitigation specialist "plays an important role ... in maintaining close contact with the client
and his family while the case is pending").
132 See discussion supra Part I.B.
133 See O'Brien, supra note 6, at 697 ("Because qualified mitigation specialists are essen-
tial to the preparation of any capital case, they are in great demand. The unfortunate reality is
that, just as with competent capital defense attorneys, demand for qualified mitigation special-
ists exceeds the supply.").
134 See, e.g., Michael Kiefer, Fast Death Penalty Trials Urged, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 3,
2007, at 1. The capital defender offices in Phoenix, Arizona, are a dramatic example of this
phenomenon. As of February 3, 2007, more than 130 death penalty cases were pending in
Maricopa County Superior Court. Id. This number "exceeds the total number of defendants
who received the death penalty nationwide last year." Jennifer Steinhauer, Policy Shift on
Death Penalty Overwhelms Arizona Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007, at AI5. As a result of
the exceedingly high number of pending capital trials, the three capital defender offices serv-
ing Maricopa County hired a number of new mitigation specialists to try to staff the capital
defense teams for the pending death penalty cases. (Telephone Interview with Barbara
Bumpus, Mitigation Specialist, in Maricopa County, Ariz. (Sept. 17, 2007)) (on file with au-
thor). According to Richard C. Dieter, the executive director of the nonprofit Death Penalty
Information Center, Maricopa is "almost certainly" among the counties with the highest num-
ber of pending death penalty cases in the nation. See Steinhauer, supra, at AI5. The policy
change in charging more death penalty cases than it had previously charged is attributed, at
least in part, to d new county attorney who took office in 2005. "By comparison, in 2004, the
year before [Andrew P.] Thomas became county attorney, the office sought the death penalty
in 28 of 108 cases." Id. Another apt comparison is Harris County, Texas, which has long been
known as one of the most aggressive capital jurisdictions in the country. As of March 2007,
Harris County had seventeen such cases pending. See id.
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tween their extensive responsibilities and the ethical constraints they ex-
perience in both law and social work.
A. Constraints Imposed by Legal Ethics
Attorneys following the Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitiga-
tion Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases (Supplementary
Guidelines) will assert that legal ethics trump social work ethics when a
social worker is employed as a member of the capital mitigation team:
social workers are not "doing" social work when they are employed as
capital mitigation specialists, so their capital "client" is not a client in the
social work sense, but rather a client in the legal sense, and thus the legal
ethics rules prevail. 135 Another version of this argument is that because
the attorney was first assigned to the client in a legal capacity, any non-
lawyer who joins the legal team does so under the attorney-client um-
brella rather than under her own professional umbrella, and thus the at-
torney-client rules should prevail. 136
While attorneys may assume that legal ethics should trump social
work ethics in line with this guiding principle, the 1989 and the 2003
versions of the ABA Guidelines do not provide specific support for that
position. It was only recently, through the newly issued Supplementary
Guidelines,137 that the Supplementary Guidelines clarified that "all mem-
bers of the defense team are agents of defense counsel. They are bound
by rules of professional responsibility that govern the conduct of counsel
respecting privilege, diligence and loyalty to the client." 138 Given the
wide range of investigative latitude a mitigation specialist must be capa-
ble of pursuing, and given that mitigation specialists are often trained
social workers who come to the capital defense team with their own pro-
fessional ethics codes-that may or may not conflict with legal ethics-
this clarification was much needed. Even though the Supplementary
Guidelines have clarified the expectation that non-lawyers serving on
capital defense teams must obey professional legal ethics, 139 this clarifi-
cation does not mean that tensions caused by conflicting professional
norms suddenly disappear. To better understand how constraints im-
posed by legal ethics and social work ethics interact on interdisciplinary
capital defense teams, it is necessary to analyze the interaction from the
lawyer's vantage point as well as from the social worker's vantage point.
135 Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 14, Guideline 4.1(C) (specifying that non-law-
yers on the defense team are "agents of defense counsel" who "are bound by rules of profes-
sional responsibility that govern the conduct of counsel respecting privilege, diligence and
loyalty to the client.").
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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To this end, Section 1 begins from a lawyer's vantage point-first, ex-
ploring additional guidance the ABA Guidelines provide, and then, turn-
ing to the ABA Model Rules to examine the guidance they contain.140
1. What the ABA Guidelines Do and Do Not Say
In addition to the Supplementary Guidelines' recent clarification re-
garding the roles of "agents of defense counsel,"'141 Commentary to
Guideline 2.1 states the importance of the following:
It is essential that both full-time defenders and assigned
counsel be fully independent, free to act on behalf of
their clients as dictated by their best professional judg-
ment. A system that does not guarantee the integrity of
the professional relation is fundamentally deficient in
that it fails to provide counsel who have the same free-
dom of action as the lawyer whom the person with suffi-
cient means can afford to retain. 142
This Commentary speaks to the fact that counsel for the capital de-
fendant must be free to act on behalf of the capital client in order to
safeguard the integrity of the professional relation between client and
attorney. Although its discussion focuses on attorneys, when read to-
gether with Supplementary Guideline 4. 1(C), 14 3 other members of the
legal team-such as mitigation specialists-are included in the Com-
mentary because they are members of the capital defense team. Thus,
the Commentary may be understood as stating that social-worker-trained
mitigation specialists must be "free to act on behalf of their clients as
dictated by their best professional judgment."'' Because social-worker-
trained mitigation specialists are non-lawyers on a legal team, the Com-
mentary and the Supplementary Guidelines anticipate that their profes-
sional judgments are consistent with the lawyer's professional
obligations. 14
In addition to reading the new Supplementary Guidelines together
with the existing ABA Guidelines and Commentary, in order to better
understand the "professional obligations" a capital attorney brings to the
140 See Fox, supra note 12, at 776 (asserting that the "core principles expressed in the
ABA Guidelines, Commentary, and Supplementary Guidelines are no more than detailed, con-
textualized explanations of counsel's existing obligations under the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct").
141 See Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 14, Guideline 4.1(C).
142 See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, Guideline 2.1 cmt. (citing AM. BAR Assoc.,
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDINO DEFENSE SERVICES § 5-1.3 cmt. (3d ed.
1992).
143 Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 14, Guideline 4.1(C).
144 See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, Guideline 2.1 cmt.
145 Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 14, Guideline 4.1(C).
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defense team, it is also necessary to understand the attorney's profes-
sional obligations under the ABA Model Rules.
2. Guidance from the ABA Model Rules
While each state has adopted its own ethics rules governing law-
yers' professional conduct in the state where the lawyer practices, most
states have based their ethics rules on the ABA Model Rules. 146 Histori-
cally, the guidance that the American Bar Association provides in legal
ethics started with the original Canons of Professional Ethics (Canons)
that the ABA adopted in 1908.147 Through a long process of evaluation
and self-study, the Canons continued to be updated throughout the ensu-
ing years. Then in 1964, a special ABA committee produced the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), which a large majority of
states and federal jurisdictions adopted. 148 Through another self-study
process, 49 the Code was eventually replaced by the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct (Model Rules) in 1983. The ABA Model Rules have
since been updated through various amendments, but the 1983 blueprint
remains largely intact and continues to inform the ethics rules in all but
one state (California). 150 Thus, while the ABA Model Rules are not
binding within any state until that jurisdiction adopts them,15' because
146 See Am. Bar Assoc., ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Website, http:Hwww.
abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/model-rules.html (last visited June 15, 2009) (observing that "to date,
California is the only state[ ] that do[es] not have professional conduct rules that follow the
format of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.").
147 See Am. Bar Assoc., ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Website, Preface to
the Model Rules, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/preface.html (last visited May 22, 2009)
(explaining that the Canons "were based principally on the Code of Ethics adopted by the
Alabama Bar Association in 1887, which in turn had been borrowed largely from the lectures
of Judge George Sharswood, published in 1854 as Professional Ethics, and from fifty resolu-
tions included in David Hoffman's A Course of Legal Study (2d ed. 1836).").
148 See id. ("[T]he House of Delegates of the American Bar Association created a Special
Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards ('the Wright Committee') to assess whether
changes should be made in the then-current Canons of Professional Ethics. The Model Code
was adopted by the House of Delegates on August 12, 1969, and subsequently by the vast
majority of state and federal jurisdictions.").
149 See id. Starting in 1977, a newly formed Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards "under[took] a comprehensive rethinking of the ethical premises and problems of
the legal profession," evaluated the Model Code, and "determin[ed] that amendment of the
Code would not achieve a comprehensive statement of the law governing the legal profession."
Id. Therefore, the Commission "commenced a six-year study and drafting process that pro-
duced the Model Rules of Professional Conduct." Id. The House of Delegates of the ABA
adopted these Model Rules on August 2, 1983, and at the time the edition of the Model Rules
it had passed went to press, "all but eight of the jurisdictions had adopted new professional
standards based on these Model Rules." Id.
150 See supra note 146.
151 Am. Bar Assoc., ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Website, Preamble and
Scope, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/preamble.html (last visited May 22, 2009) ("Compli-
ance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding
and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and
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most jurisdictions have adopted some form of the ABA Model Rules,
they serve as the leading baseline and guide for what constitutes ethical
practice of law. 152 With this understanding of the ABA Model Rules in
mind, two of the rules that most impact the interaction of mitigation spe-
cialists and lawyers are examined next.
a. ABA Model Rule 5.3(b)
In addition to the Supplementary Guidelines' clarification that non-
lawyers on capital defense teams are subject to the same legal ethics as
lawyers, 153 the ABA Model Rules speak to this issue. According to Rule
5.3(b), "A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is com-
patible with the professional obligations of the lawyer . . . ." Any
remaining ambiguity within the ABA Guidelines concerning the legal
ethical standards that apply to non-lawyers serving on capital defense
teams is thus rendered obsolete when read in conjunction with Rule
5.3(b), which states that the "conduct" of "non-lawyers" over whom the
lawyer has "direct supervisory authority" shall be "compatible with the
professional obligations of the lawyer."' 55 Moreover, even though the
terminology section of the ABA Model Rules does not define "non-law-
yer," 56 the Comment to Rule 5.3(b) clarifies that the term "non-lawyer"
includes "assistants in [the lawyer's] practice, including secretaries, in-
vestigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals."' 57 The Com-
ment further explains that "[s]uch assistants, whether employees or
independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's
professional services."' 58 The term "non-lawyer" is thus understood to
include mitigation specialists working on a capital defense team. The
lawyer who heads the capital defense team has "direct supervisory au-
thority" over the mitigation specialist when the mitigation specialist
works for the lawyer to help develop the evidence that the lawyer will
introduce at the sentencing phase of the capital trial.
finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do
not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no
worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply pro-
vide a framework for the ethical practice of law.").
152 Fox, supra note 12, at 775 (noting that the "current iteration of the rules is in the
process of being adopted in virtually every jurisdiction").
153 See Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 14, Guideline 4.1(C).
154 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3(b) (2008) ("Responsibilities Regarding
Nonlawyer Assistants").
155 Id.
156 See id. R. 1.0 ("Terminology").
157 Id. R. 5.3(b) cmt. Il1.
158 Id.
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Similarly straightforward is the clause specifying that the non-law-
yer's conduct must be "compatible with the professional obligations of
the lawyer." A mitigation specialist who compromises client confidenti-
ality to counsel or treat the client's relative would be an example of "in-
compatible conduct" because these actions would violate the
confidentiality obligations the supervising attorney must follow.' 5 9 The
basic idea of Rule 5.3(b) thus reinforces Supplementary Guideline
4.1 (C)'s clarification that mitigation specialists working on a capital de-
fense team must follow the same ethical rules that the lawyer on that
team follows, and that the lawyer must make "reasonable efforts to en-
sure" that the mitigation specialist is indeed following the same legal
rules. 160
The only ambiguity that remains by reading the Supplementary
Guidelines together with Rule 5.3(b) is the subjective phrase "reasonable
efforts to ensure." The Comment for Rule 5.3 helps clarify this phrase:
A lawyer must give such assistants appropriate instruc-
tion and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of
their employment, particularly regarding the obligation
not to disclose information relating to representation of
the client, and should be responsible for their work prod-
uct. The measures employed in supervising non-lawyers
should take account of the fact that they do not have le-
gal training and are not subject to professional
discipline. 161
According to this Comment, "reasonable efforts to ensure" compli-
ance with legal ethical rules includes "appropriate instruction" and "su-
pervision" concerning the ethical aspects of the mitigation specialist's
work.162 It is not enough to assume that a mitigation specialist will know
what the legal ethical rules are and will prioritize those legal rules above
the ethical rules governing social work. Whatever "measures" the super-
vising lawyer uses to provide ethical instruction and guidance, such mea-
sures "should take account of the fact that [mitigation specialists] do not
159 See id. R. 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation
of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b)."); see also
infra Parts I.B.la, 2.a, 2.b.
160 This understanding of Model Rule 5.3(b) parallels the recent clarification in the Sup-
plementary Guidelines, supra note 14, Guideline 4.1(C), which states that "[a]ll members of
the defense team are agents of defense counsel" who are "bound by rules of professional
responsibility that govern the conduct of counsel respecting privilege, diligence, and loyalty to
the client."
161 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 5.3 cmt. [1].
162 Id.
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have legal training."' 163 Rule 5.3(b) thus specifies that the supervising
lawyer take measures to ensure that the mitigation specialist knows and
complies with the same ethical rules to which the lawyer must adhere.
b. ABA Model Rule 5.3(c)
In addition to ensuring that mitigation specialists comply with legal
ethical rules, both Rule 5.3 and the Comment to Rule 5.3 highlight that if
a mitigation specialist does not follow the rules, the supervising attor-
ney-and not the mitigation specialist-is subject to professional legal
discipline. Rule 5.3(c) makes this observation when it states:
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a
person that would be a violation of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the spe-
cific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial
authority in the law firm in which the person is em-
ployed, or has direct supervisory authority over the per-
son, and knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to
take reasonable remedial action.164
In other words, when a mitigation specialist's conduct violates the
ABA Model Rules, the lawyer shall be subject to professional discipline
if the lawyer (1) ordered the conduct, (2) knew about the conduct and
approved of it, (3) knew about the conduct in time to stop it from hap-
pening but failed to do so, or (4) knew about the conduct in time to
lessen the damage but failed to do so. 165
Notably, the supervising lawyer on the defense team is not the only
lawyer subject to professional discipline in such situations. Rule
5.3(c)(2) also contemplates that in addition to the lawyer on the defense
team who is directly supervising the mitigation specialist, other lawyers
in the same office or firm who have "managerial authority" (such as the
head of the public defender office) are subject to professional discipline
as well.' 66 To this end, the second part of the Comment to Rule 5.3
"requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make
reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed
to provide reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm will act in a
way compatible with the Rules of Professional Conduct."'167 Reading
163 Id.
164 Id. R. 5.3(c).
165 See id.
166 See id. R. 5.3(c)(2).
167 Id. R. 5.3 cmt. [2].
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Rule 5.3 and its Comments together as a whole, the take-home message
is that both the managerial attorney and the direct-supervision attorney
must take steps to educate the mitigation specialists about their legal eth-
ical duties and to comply with those duties themselves. If the attorneys
fail to do so, courts could subject them to professional discipline. The
fact that the mitigation specialist is not subject to the same professional
discipline is no excuse, and is in fact further reason to ensure that the
mitigation specialist knows what the rules are and follows them.
The fact that Rule 5.3 observes that a non-lawyer member of a legal
team is not subject to legal professional discipline is especially interest-
ing in the context of capital cases-while mitigation specialists are not
subject to professional legal discipline when found in violation of the
rules governing legal ethics, they may be subject to ethical discipline in
their own professional field. As explained in Section B, the Supplemen-
tary Guidelines and ABA Model Rules could lead to a situation in which
non-lawyers are forced to adhere to legal ethics they would not be disci-
plined for breaking in the legal field (because they are not lawyers),
while their adherence to legal ethics results in ethical discipline in their
own professional field.
B. Constraints Imposed by Social Worker Ethics
On a national scale, when one compares the national bodies influ-
encing legal ethics with the national bodies influencing social work eth-
ics, the ABA is to professional legal ethics as the NASW is to
professional social work ethics. Just as the ABA has published a Model
Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers, the NASW has published a
Code of Ethics for social workers. While each national organization has
published national ethical standards to which lawyers and social workers
should respectively abide, one structural difference is that the ABA
Model Rules have a rule-based focus and the NASW Code of Ethics has
a code-based focus.' 68
Another difference is the extent to which the two publications have
influenced the ethical procedures and rules in individual states. The
ABA Model Rules have had an enormous impact on state legal ethics
rules, causing nearly every state to adopt some version of the ABA
Model Rules. 169 In contrast, the NASW Code of Ethics has not had a
168 See Fox, supra note 12, at 775-76 (observing that "there is never a suggestion that the
standards established by [the ABA Model Rules] are mere goals" and that "there is universal
recognition that the rules establish measurable levels of performance that lawyers in fact are
expected to achieve, day in and day out, for clients large and small, criminal and civil, on Wall
Street and on Main Street").
169 See id. at 775 (noting that the "Model Rules of Professional Conduct have basically
occupied the field" and that the "current iteration of the rules is in the process of being adopted
in virtually every jurisdiction").
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similarly widespread impact on the state ethics rules governing social
workers. For example, the NASW Code of Ethics is a fifteen-page docu-
ment with one section detailing six "ethical principles" and correspond-
ing "values," and another section detailing six "ethical standards." Each
standard has multiple subparts beneath it further explaining what the
standard means.170 In contrast to this substantial fifteen-page document
with multiple subparts, the Texas State Board of Social Work Examin-
ers-the state body charged with processing complaints concerning
Texas social workers-has adopted a one-page Code of Conduct contain-
ing thirteen one-sentence provisions with which Texas social workers
must comply. 171 While some of Texas's thirteen provisions correspond
with provisions in the NASW Code of Ethics,172 the NASW's wide-
reaching scope and level of detail does not compare to Texas's abbrevi-
ated document.
This means that on a state-by-state level, while each state has
adopted its own legal and social work ethics rules with corresponding
state procedures to process complaints, the influence that the ABA has
had on each state's legal ethics rules is different from the influence the
NASW has had on each state's social work ethics rules. This difference
is worth noting, especially given that each organization shares a similar
level of remoteness from the individual lawyers and social workers
whom it purports to guide: national membership in both the ABA and the
NASW is voluntary. 173 This means that if a citizen files a complaint
with the NASW and the NASW investigates the complaint and finds that
it is well-founded,1 74 the worst consequence the social worker faces is
removal from the NASW's membership list. Because membership in the
NASW is voluntary, expulsion from membership in the NASW has no
effect on the social worker's ability to practice social work in the state in
which she is licensed because the ability to practice social work is regu-
170 See NASW CODE OF ETHIcs, supra note 19.
171 See TEX. STATE BD. OF SOC. WORK EXAm'RS, CODE OF CONDUCT [hereinafter TEXAS
CODE OF CONDUCT], available at http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/socialwork/sw_ethics.doc (last
visited May 22, 2009).
172 Compare id. R. (a)(9) ("A social worker shall not have sexual contact with a client or
with a person who has been a client."), with NASW CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 19, § 1.11
("Social workers should not sexually harass clients. Sexual harassment includes sexual ad-
vances, sexual solicitation, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature.").
173 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble and Scope (2008) ("Compliance
with the Rules ... depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance.").
174 The NASW has a comprehensive sixty-page document that thoroughly explains its
procedures for professional review. In sum, the NASW has "established a peer review process
that permits two methods (mediation or adjudication) of reviewing grievances pertaining to
professional conduct." See BD. OF Dis., NAT'L Ass'N OF SOC. WORKERS, NASW PROCE-
DURES FOR PROFESSIONAL REvIEW vii (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter NASW PROCEDURES], avail-
able at http://www.naswdc.org/nasw/ethics/ProceduresManual2006.pdf.
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lated strictly by state licensing boards. If, however, the same citizen files
a complaint with the Texas State Board of Social Work Examiners and
the Board finds that the complaint is well-founded, the Board has the
ability to prohibit the social worker from practicing social work within
the state of Texas.' 75
Another difference between the ABA and the NASW is that the
NASW has a mechanism within it to process complaints through an adju-
dicatory or mediation-based process.' 76 In contrast, the ABA has no
similar mechanism. If a citizen reports an ethical violation by a lawyer
to the ABA, the ABA merely refers the citizen to the appropriate lawyer
disciplinary agency in the state where the lawyer practices.1 77
Summarily, the NASW Code of Ethics has some limited investiga-
tive and disciplinary capabilities that the ABA Model Rules lack, while
the NASW Code of Ethics has not been as widely adopted by individual
state governing bodies as the ABA Model Rules. Still, even though more
states have adopted the ABA Model Rules, the NASW Code of Ethics is
the most relevant national document describing the national values, prin-
ciples, and standards that guide social workers' ethical conduct. 178
Mindful of these similarities and differences between the ABA
Model Rules and the NASW Code of Ethics, the remainder of this Sec-
tion explores specific provisions detailed in the NASW Code of Ethics
that are the most relevant to social workers employed as mitigation spe-
cialists. While every capital case is unique, three of the more common
situations that social-worker-trained mitigation specialists might encoun-
ter are discussed under three rubrics: ethical conflicts that arise (1) when
working with clients and clients' family members, (2) between clients'
interests and the interests of society at large, and (3) when a client's
decisions detrimentally affect his own well being. To explore these ten-
sions in the context of capital mitigation, each section begins with a hy-
pothetical mitigation scenario and then analyzes the applicability of
social work ethics within the context of that scenario.
175 See TEXAS CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 171 ("Any violation of the code of ethics or
standards of practice will constitute unethical conduct . . . and is grounds for disciplinary
action.").
176 See NASW PROCEDURES, supra note 174, at ix.
177 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5; ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBIL-
ITY, DIRECTORY OF LAWYER DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES (2000), available at http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/regulation/directory.pdf (last visited June 15, 2009).
178 See NASW CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 19, Purpose of the NASW Code of Ethics
("The Code offers a set of values, principles, and standards to guide decision making and
conduct when ethical issues arise.").
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1. Responsibilities to Clients and to Clients' Family Members
a. Ethical scenario one: Defendant's adult sister abused by
father
Consider the adult sister of a capital defendant. The attorney for the
criminal defendant assembles a defense team to prepare for trial. As part
of the pre-trial mitigation investigation, the mitigation specialist inter-
views the defendant's adult sister. During a series of interviews, the sis-
ter discloses to the mitigation specialist that when she was a child, she
was molested by her father and that her father also molested her
brother-the capital defendant-when he was a child.
If the mitigation specialist obtains this information as a member of
the legal defense team, the ABA Model Rules suggest that the mitigation
specialist's ethical duty is not to the person who has provided the infor-
mation but to the mitigation specialist's client-the capital defendant.
This is because mitigation specialists are critical members of the defense
team and must prioritize the interests and confidentiality of their capital
clients above all else. 179
ABA Model Rule 1.6(a) provides direct support for this position
when it states that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the
disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation
or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b)." 180 Rule 1.6(b) then lists
six instances in which a lawyer may-but is not obligated to-reveal
confidential information relating to representation of a client.'81 Of the
179 See discussion supra Part I.A; see also ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 20 ("It is
essential that both full-time defenders and assigned counsel be fully independent, free to act on
behalf of their clients as dictated by their best professional judgment."); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representa-
tion of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized
in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b)."); id. R.
5.3(b) ("[A] lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reason-
able efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations
of the lawyer.").
180 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.6(a); see also Supplementary Guidelines,
supra note 14, at 4. I(D) ("Counsel must provide mitigation specialists with knowledge of the
law affecting their work, including an understanding of . . .rules affecting confidentiality,
disclosure, privileges and protections.").
18i The six instances listed in Model Rule 1.6(b) are:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; (2) to prevent the
client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in sub-
stantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of
which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services (3) to prevent, mitigate or
rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is rea-
sonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services; (4) to secure
legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules; (5) to establish a claim
or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
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six instances in which a lawyer may reveal confidential information,
none are relevant to the hypothetical scenario of an adult sister who was
sexually abused by her father many years ago.
In contrast to the legal ethics governing confidentiality, a social
worker has distinct ethical rules related to confidential information.
Aside from possible mandatory reporting requirements, which will be
discussed in the context of the second hypothetical scenario (analyzing
ethical tensions between a client and society at large), a trained social-
worker-mitigation-specialist must decide whether a professional obliga-
tion to work with the sister to counsel or treat her exists.' 8 2 To answer
these questions, the social-worker-trained mitigation specialist would
consult provisions from the NASW Code of Ethics to decide whether
those provisions provide useful guidance. The analysis of how to ap-
proach this first scenario from the vantage point of a social-worker-
trained mitigation specialist thus begins by exploring the basic structure
and purpose of the NASW Code of Ethics.
b. The NASW Code of Ethics: Purpose of the code
The NASW Code of Ethics is comprised of four parts: Preamble,
Purpose of the NASW Code of Ethics, Ethical Principles, and Ethical
Standards. 8 3 In terms of thinking about the collaboration between so-
cial-worker-trained mitigation specialists and attorneys on capital de-
fense teams, the Purpose section specifies that the NASW Code of Ethics
is "relevant to all social workers and social work students, regardless of
their professional functions, the settings in which they work, or the popu-
lations they serve."1 84 It also states that the "Code provides ethical stan-
dards to which the general public can hold the social work profession
accountable."' 185 This introductory section of the NASW Code of Ethics
makes clear that its principles and standards are intended to guide social
work professionals, no matter the context in which they may be working.
Indeed, the Purpose section anticipates that professional obligations may
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in
any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client; or (6) to comply
with other law or a court order.
Id. R. 1.6(b).
182 See NASW CODE OF ETmics, supra note 19, Ethical Principles ("Ethical Principle:
Social workers' primary goal is to help people in need and to address social problems. ...
Social workers draw on their knowledge, values, and skills to help people in need and to
address social problems."); see also id. Ethical Principles ("Ethical Principle: Social workers
recognize the central importance of human relationships. Social workers understand that rela-
tionships between and among people are an important vehicle for change.").
183 See id.
184 Id. Purpose of the NASW Code of Ethics.
185 Id.
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sometimes conflict, and when that happens, social work professionals
should look to the NASW Code of Ethics for guidance because the
"Code is designed to help social workers identify relevant considerations
when professional obligations conflict or ethical uncertainties arise."' 8 6
While recognizing both that professional obligations may conflict
and that social workers should consult the NASW Code of Ethics to help
navigate such situations, nowhere does the Code help social workers de-
cide when or if it should take priority over conflicting ethical standards
from another profession. To that end, the most guidance the Code pro-
vides is to recognize that "[e]thical decision making is a process"187 and
that,
[t]here are many instances in social work where simple
answers are not available to resolve complex ethical is-
sues. Social workers should take into consideration all
the values, principles, and standards in this Code that are
relevant to any situation in which ethical judgment is
warranted. Social workers' decisions and actions should
be consistent with the spirit as well as the letter of this
Code. 88
With these overarching purposes of the NASW Code of Ethics in
mind, social-worker-trained mitigation specialists who consult the Code
to see if it applies in their capacity as mitigation specialists on legal de-
fense teams would conclude that at least thus far in their analysis of the
Code, it does apply to them. The next section proceeds to analyze the
Code in more depth by examining some of the ethical principles most
relevant to social workers employed in capital mitigation and how those
ethical principles may inform a social-worker-trained mitigation special-
ist about how to navigate the ethical tensions within the sister scenario.
c. The NASW Code of Ethics: Ethical principles
The NASW Code of Ethics identifies six core values on which cor-
responding principles are based: "service, social justice, dignity and
worth of the person, importance of human relationships, integrity, and
competence." 189 The ethical principles that are most relevant for capital
mitigation are the ethical principles corresponding to social justice, the
importance of human relationships, integrity, and dignity and worth of
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. Ethical Principles.
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the person.190 The next sections explore each of these ethical principles
while also examining how they interact with the sister hypothetical.
i. Challenge social injustice
This ethical principle specifies that:
Social workers pursue social change, particularly with
and on behalf of vulnerable and oppressed individuals
and groups of people. Social workers' social change ef-
forts are focused primarily on issues of poverty, unem-
ployment, discrimination, and other forms of social
injustice. These activities seek to promote sensitivity to
and knowledge about oppression and cultural and ethnic
diversity. Social workers strive to ensure access to
needed information, services, and resources; equality of
opportunity; and meaningful participation in decision
making for all people. 191
Because capital criminal defendants are typically some of the most
vulnerable and oppressed people in our society, 192 social workers em-
ployed as capital mitigation specialists are fulfilling this principle in di-
rect and complex ways. By helping to develop mitigation evidence that a
defense attorney presents at the sentencing phase, the mitigation special-
ist is striving toward social justice in the death penalty arena. To the
extent that a mitigation specialist's work promotes "sensitivity to and
knowledge about... [the] oppression and cultural and ethnic diversity"
the defendant has experienced throughout his life, perhaps the mitigation
specialist's work will result in the jury better understanding the humanity
of the capital defendant. 193
At the same time that this ethical principle seems to have positive
application in the death penalty arena, the diverse responsibilities of a
capital mitigation specialist complicate the matter. For example, re-
turning to the sister hypothetical, because a mitigation specialist cannot
counsel or treat the sister, it is difficult for the mitigation specialist to
"strive to ensure access to needed information, services, and resources"
for the sister.194 Certainly the mitigation specialist can suggest referrals
or give the sister a list of agencies or other professionals whom the sister
190 The analysis of the first hypothetical discusses the principles relating to social justice,
human relationships, and integrity. The analysis of the third hypothetical discusses the princi-
ple of dignity and worth of the person.
191 NASW CODE OF Emnucs, supra note 19, Ethical Principles.
192 See Haney, supra note 30, at 608.
193 See id.; see also NASW CODE OF ETmics, supra note 19, Ethical Principles.
194 NASW CODE OF ETmIcs, supra note 19, Ethical Principles.
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should contact, but referrals and business cards only go so far toward
"ensur[ing] access."' 195
Even more complicated is the notion of ensuring "meaningful par-
ticipation in decision-making for all people."' 196 In the sister scenario, a
conflict could emerge between the need for the sister to testify about the
abuse she and her brother have suffered and the fact that if only the
sister's own best interests were at stake, the best course of action for the
sister would perhaps be to undergo years of therapy to heal from the
abuse before testifying publicly. Indeed, testifying about the abuse may
never be in the sister's best interests, no matter how many years of ther-
apy she benefited from prior to the trial.
In sum, if the mitigation specialist's professional duty is to the capi-
tal client and not to the sister, the degree to which the mitigation special-
ist can engage the sister in "meaningful participation" in the sister's
decision whether or not to testify on behalf of her brother is limited. In
the most conflict-laden situation, the mitigation specialist's duty may be
to persuade the sister to testify on behalf of her brother, even though such
a decision is against the best interests of the sister herself.
This first principle thus presents a complicated ethical tightrope for
a social worker employed as a mitigation specialist, especially a social
worker who interviews the sister of a capital defendant and discovers that
she has been molested by their father. In some ways this job of the
mitigation specialist follows the ethical principle of promoting social jus-
tice, but in other ways it undercuts the same principle.
ii. Recognize the central importance of human
relationships
In describing the importance of human relationships, another ethical
principle in the NASW Code of Ethics states,
Social workers understand that relationships between
and among people are an important vehicle for change.
Social workers engage people as partners in the helping
process. Social workers seek to strengthen relationships
among people in a purposeful effort to promote, restore,
maintain, and enhance the well-being of individuals,
families, social groups, organizations, and
communities. 197
When a mitigation specialist tracks down a long-lost relative of the
capital defendant and reunites them, such action might very well serve
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
2009]
376 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18:337
the social work principle of strengthening and restoring the individual's
and the family's well-being, while simultaneously satisfying the legal
principle of gathering the strongest evidence possible for the sentencing
phase. Conversely, the sister scenario paints a different picture of the
inherent tension in striving to build and restore relationships between
people within the capital context: the mitigation specialist may need the
sister to testify about her abusive father in order to present compelling
mitigation evidence to the jury, but the act of testifying about the abuse
may in turn pull the family further apart. Family discord is especially
likely if other family members do not know about the abuse the son and
daughter endured, or if other family members do not want the sister to
make such personal family matters known to the public at large. In such
situations, the mitigation specialist must somehow reconcile the legal
ethical position of putting forth the best defense possible 198 with the so-
cial work ethical principle of restoring human relationships.
To do this, the mitigation specialist might decide that the best way
to reconcile this tension is to be as honest as possible with the sister
before she testifies, preparing her for the potential fallout with other
members of her family while also ensuring that the sister will continue to
testify. While not ideal, perhaps this approach is the best the mitigation
specialist can do given the irreconcilable tension between the ethical
mandates of the two professions. The underlying principle of behaving
honestly and responsibly is explained further below.
iii. Behave in a trustworthy manner
The final ethical principle most relevant to the sister scenario speaks
to the value of integrity:
Social workers are continually aware of the profession's
mission, values, ethical principles, and ethical standards
and practice in a manner consistent with them. Social
workers act honestly and responsibly and promote ethi-
cal practices on the part of the organizations with which
they are affiliated.' 99
At the end of the day, after wading through the other ethical princi-
ples described above, perhaps this ethical principle is a lifeboat for social
workers who serve on capital defense teams. While striving to be mind-
ful of and act consistently with social work's mission and values, this
principle recognizes the importance of "promot[ing] ethical practices on
the part of the organizations with which [the social workers] are affili-
198 See discussion supra Part I.A.
199 NASW CODE OF ETHiCS, supra note 19, Ethical Principles.
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ated. ' '200 Although this statement does not help a social worker decide
whether legal ethics or social work ethics should trump when their ethi-
cal mandates collide, the Code of Ethics' recognition that it is an ethical
principle in and of itself to promote ethical practices within the organiza-
tion with which the social worker is affiliated-such as a legal capital
defense team-at least opens the door to the possibility that the Code
might anticipate situations in which social work's ethics cede to legal
ethics. 20 1
d. Ethical responsibilities to clients
In addition to ethical principles, the NASW Code of Ethics also sets
forth specific ethical standards. The ethical standard entitled "Social
Workers' Ethical Responsibilities to Clients" (Standard 1.06(c)), is rele-
vant to the sister scenario because it begins by reinforcing the preceding
discussion concerning social workers' responsibilities to clients and fam-
ily members. Standard 1.06(c) explains that "[s]ocial workers should not
engage in dual or multiple relationships with clients ... in which there is
a risk of exploitation or potential harm to the client." 202 This standard
thus directs social workers to "provide services" only to people who are
the social worker's designated "clients," as well as to ensure that family
members with whom the social worker interacts are aware of who the
social worker's clients are and are not. Applying this standard to capital
mitigation, social workers interviewing a capital defendant's family
members should clarify that all family members know that the capital
client is the social worker's sole client.
If a social worker were to read this ethical standard and the corre-
sponding ethical principles described above, the social worker would
find support for the argument that an easy way to reconcile ethical ten-
sions in the mitigation scenario is to warn the defendant's family mem-
bers that they are not the social worker's clients, and that the capital
defendant is the only client of the social worker. Indeed, this argument
would seem relatively straightforward were it not for the introduction to
Ethical Standard 1.01 ("Commitment to Clients"), which states:
Social workers' primary responsibility is to promote the
well being of clients. In general, clients' interests are
primary. However, social workers' responsibility to the
200 Id.
201 This is especially true when understood in the context of the Supplementary Guide-
lines' clarification that non-lawyers on the defense team are "agents of defense counsel" who
"are bound by rules of professional responsibility that govern the conduct of counsel respect-
ing privilege, diligence and loyalty to the client." Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 14,
Guideline 4.1(C).
202 NASW CODE OF ETics, supra note 19, § 1.06(c).
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larger society or specific legal obligations may on lim-
ited occasions supersede the loyalty owed clients, and
clients should be so advised. (Examples include when a
social worker is required by law to report that a client
has abused a child or has threatened to harm self or
others.)20 3
The introduction to Ethical Standard 1.01 thus reveals an inherent
tension within the Code that social workers, as capital mitigation special-
ists, must strive to resolve: how to balance the social worker's ethical
duties to clients and to society at large. Section 2 examines this question
in greater detail.
2. Responsibilities to Clients and to Society at Large
The preceding section examined specific ethical principles as they
relate to the capital defendant and his family. A social worker has an
obligation to society at large as well as to a defendant. However, the
interests of the defendant's family do not always coincide with the inter-
ests of society. Sometimes the interests of the defendant's family coin-
cide with the interests of the defendant but diverge from the interests of
society at large. In such situations, social-worker-trained mitigation spe-
cialists must decide how to reconcile their ethical duties to the capital
defendant and their ethical duties to society at large. The next hypotheti-
cal scenario sets forth a context in which to examine this question.
a. Ethical scenario two: Defendant's adult sister abused by
defendant
Consider the adult sister of a capital defendant who was sexually
abused, when she was a child, by the capital defendant. As part of the
pre-trial investigation, the mitigation specialist interviews the sister of
the defendant and learns that the capital defendant molested her when he
was a child. The sister haltingly discloses this information in the context
of explaining that she believes the defendant himself was sexually
abused by their father. The sister explicitly states that she does not want
this information revealed to anyone and that she will do everything in her
power to prevent her brother from being sentenced to death. In such a
scenario, even though the defendant and the sister's interests diverge to
the extent that the defendant harmed the sister when she was younger,
because the sister wants to help save the defendant's life, their interests
converge in this situation.
203 See id. § 1.01.
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As explained earlier, the legal ethics rules governing confidentiality,
especially Model Rule 1.6(a), 204 suggest that because this information is
discovered during the course of representing the capital client on the le-
gal defense team, the mitigation specialist must keep this information
confidential. 205 Even if the sister did not specify that she wanted the
information to be kept confidential, Model Rule 1.6(a) could be read to
entrust the mitigation specialist with the duty of not disclosing such con-
fidential information in order to protect the client in certain circum-
stances. This is because Rule 1.6(b) lists six instances in which the
attorney may choose to reveal confidential information, and of those six
instances, the only one that is potentially relevant to information learned
during pre-trial capital mitigation investigation is Rule 1.6(b)(1). That
Rule explains that a lawyer may reveal such confidential information "to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent rea-
sonably certain death or substantial bodily harm."'206 Since the adult sis-
ter who was abused in the past is not at immediate risk of death or
substantial bodily harm, an attorney (and the non-lawyers on the attor-
ney's team) must keep this information confidential in order to comply
with the ethical mandates of the Supplementary Guidelines and ABA
Model Rules.
In contrast to the legal ethics rules governing client confidentiality,
a social worker has different ethical duties designed to protect society at
large. This weighing of the client's needs against the needs of society
stems from the fact that social workers have two simultaneous ethical
duties, "to protect other people from potentially dangerous clients and to
protect clients from themselves. '20 7 Because of their dual duties to pro-
tect both their clients and society at large, if mitigation specialists hear
such information in their capacity as a social-worker-trained mitigation
specialist, they must decide if they have a professional obligation to re-
port the sexual abuse by the defendant to state authorities in the interests
of protecting the "larger society. ' 20 8 The Code of Ethics does not give
204 See, e.g., ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, Guideline 2.1 cmt. ("A system that does
not guarantee the integrity of the professional relation is fundamentally deficient in that it fails
to provide counsel who have the same freedom of action as the lawyer whom the person with
sufficient means can afford to retain."); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2008)
("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the
client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b)."); id. R. 5.3(b) ("[A] lawyer
having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure
that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.")
205 See, e.g., MODEL RUL.Es OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rs. 1.6(a), 5.3(b).
206 See id. R. 1.6(b); see also supra note 172 and accompanying text.
207 NORMAN LINZER, RESOLVING ETmcAL DILEMMAS IN SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE 48
(1998).
208 See NASW CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 19, § 1.01 ("Social workers' primary respon-
sibility is to promote the well being of clients. In general, clients' interests are primary. How-
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much guidance about how to resolve these conflicting duties. The pre-
ceding discussion related to the first hypothetical began to examine a
social worker's "responsibilities to clients" in the context of conflicts that
arise between capital defendants and their family members. This section
examines the social-worker-trained mitigation specialist's "responsibili-
ties to clients" in more detail in order to explore any guidance the NASW
Code of Ethics gives in helping social workers balance their duty to pro-
tect clients with their duty to protect society at large.209
The introduction to Ethical Standard 1.01 contemplates situations in
which the client's interests are not primary, thereby complicating other
sections of the NASW Code of Ethics that specify that the client's inter-
ests are always primary. The specific example described in the introduc-
tion to Ethical Standard 1.01-the situation in which the client has
abused a child-is even more complex when it is applied to social work-
ers employed in capital mitigation: extensive research documents that
many capital defendants and capital defendants' family members have
been abused or have engaged in abuse, 210 so it is not unlikely that a
mitigation specialist may represent a capital client who has himself
abused a child.
A social-worker-trained mitigation specialist whose client has
abused a child must therefore decide whether a duty to report the client's
abuse exists. While the Code is clear that a social worker must remain
mindful of mandatory reporting requirements, the Code does not define
situations in which a social worker is "required by law" to report the
abuse. Because the NASW Code of Ethics does not answer this question,
social workers must consult the state laws where they are licensed for
further guidance about mandatory reporting requirements. 21' As an ex-
ample of the intricacies of examining this question in a state-specific
context, the remainder of this Section explores some of the questions that
could arise for a Missouri-licensed social worker who is employed as a
capital mitigation specialist for a criminal defendant facing capital
charges in Missouri, who has also abused a child in Missouri.
ever, social workers' responsibility to the larger society or specific legal obligations may on
limited occasions supersede the loyalty owed clients, and clients should be so advised.").
209 Id. Ethical Standards (The six standards that the NASW Code of Ethics highlights
concern social workers' ethical responsibilities (I) to clients; (2) to colleagues; (3) in practice
settings; (4) as professionals; (5) to the social work profession; and (6) to the broader society).
210 See, e.g., Haney, supra note 30.
211 According to the Children's Bureau/ACYF, "[alpproximately 48 States, the District of
Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands designate professions whose members are mandated by law to report child mal-
treatment." See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD
ABusE AND NEGLECT: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS, available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/
systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/mandaall.pdf (last visited May 22, 2009).
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b. Missouri's mandatory reporting statute: Abuse
According to Missouri state law, a Missouri-licensed social worker
is a designated mandatory reporter of child abuse. 21 2 Missouri statutes
further specify that mandatory reporting is required when a reporter "has
reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been subjected to abuse or
neglect" or when a reporter "observes a child being subjected to condi-
tions or circumstances that would reasonably result in abuse or
neglect." 213
Applying this statute to the capital mitigation context, if social
workers employed as mitigation specialists observe reportable child neg-
lect 214 in the home in which they are interviewing a family member, such
observations could trigger mandatory reporting requirements. Further-
more, if the mitigation specialists observe circumstances in the sister's
house that would reasonably result in neglect to the sister's own chil-
dren-such as drugs, drug paraphernalia, or simply deplorable living
conditions-the social workers may have a duty to report those condi-
tions as constituting child neglect in addition to the mandatory abuse
provisions potentially set into motion by the information the sister
provides.
In addition to reporting child neglect, mandatory reporters in Mis-
souri must also report sexual or physical abuse "inflicted on a child by
other than accidental means by those responsible for the child's care,
custody, and control. ' 215 This section of Missouri law makes no distinc-
tion in how the social worker discovers the abuse: it does not matter
whether the social worker learns about the abuse from the person who
was abused, the person responsible for the abuse, or a third-party who
knows of the abuse. Applying Missouri's mandatory reporting statute to
a social worker on a capital mitigation team thus presents numerous
mandatory reporting quandaries. For example, in the scenario in which
the defendant abused his sister, a plain meaning interpretation of the pro-
vision could suggest mandatory reporting when the sister tells the mitiga-
tion specialist that the defendant abused her.
Reading further into the Missouri statutes, however, another section
of Missouri law specifies that only the attorney-client or clergy-penitent
privilege may legally excuse a person from reporting child abuse. 216 The
permissive nature of the statute does not decisively indicate whether the
212 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.115, 568.110, 352.400 (West 2003).
213 Id. §§ 210.115, 568.110.
214 Id. § 210.110 (defining "neglect" as a "failure to provide, by those responsible for the
care, custody, and control of the child, the proper or necessary support, education as required
by law, nutrition, or medical, surgical, or any other care necessary for the child's well-being").
215 Id. § 210.110.
216 Id. § 210.140.
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legal attorney-client privilege trumps the mandatory reporting require-
ment for a social worker who is a member of a capital mitigation team.
Indeed, one way to read the Missouri statute would be to interpret it to
include only those situations in which the client himself reports abuse he
experienced, inflicted, or witnessed. Under this interpretation, because
the sister is neither the social worker's nor the attorney's client, the attor-
ney-client privilege does not extend to information the sister provides, so
a social worker on a mitigation team may indeed have a mandatory re-
porting requirement relevant to that information.
A second way to read the Missouri statute would be to assert that
the attorney-client privilege extends to all information discovered in the
course of representing the client, even if such information is not provided
directly by the client.217 This interpretation of ABA Model Rule 1.6(a)
was discussed earlier and is supported by the Supplementary Guidelines'
clarification that non-lawyer members of capital defense teams must act
consistently with lawyers' professional obligations. 218
A third interpretation of the statute is to argue that mandatory re-
porting requirements are only relevant when the abuse is on-going. In
situations such as those depicted in the sister scenario, when a sister re-
ports abuse that happened a long time ago and that she is no longer en-
during, such information does not trigger a mandatory reporting
requirement because it is not on-going or current.219 To explore the
strength of this third argument, it is necessary to consider it in light of
Missouri's statute of limitations.
c. Missouri's statute of limitations
In the criminal law context in Missouri, there is no statute of limita-
tions for crimes involving forcible rape attempted forcible rape, forcible
217 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2008) ("A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent,
the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure
is permitted by paragraph (b)."). In the capital mitigation context, the most relevant disclo-
sures that Rule 1.6(b) anticipates are that a lawyer may reveal information relating to the
representation of a client (1) "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm," id. R. 1.6(b)(1); (2) "to secure legal
advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules," id. R. 1.6(b)(4); (3) "to establish a
claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to
establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the client," id. R. 1.6(b)(5); or (4) "to comply with other law or a
court order," id, R. 1.6(b).
218 See Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 14, Guideline 4.1(C).
219 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (anticipating that a lawyer may
reveal information relating to the representation of a client "to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm").
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sodomy, kidnapping, or attempted forcible sodomy.220 Insofar as other
sexual offenses against children are concerned, the statute of limitations
for an unlawful sexual offense against a minor in Missouri "extends for
20 years after the minor reaches 18 years of age."'22' Neither the crimi-
nal statutes nor the Missouri ethics code specify how these criminal stat-
utes of limitations interact with mandatory reporting requirements for
social workers.
Applying the statute of limitations to the sister scenario, a defendant
who molested his ten-year-old sister can be criminally prosecuted for that
offense until the sister turns thirty-eight years old (or indefinitely, if the
molestation included forcible rape). If the sister discloses the abuse to
the capital mitigation specialist when she is thirty-five years old, the cap-
ital mitigation specialist may have an obligation to report the abuse be-
cause the criminal statute of limitations has not expired. Alternatively, a
different interpretation may be to assert that the possibility of criminally
prosecuting the defendant for his actions does not necessarily trigger a
mandatory reporting requirement. For example, if the goals of the
mandatory reporting requirements are grounded in the idea that a social
worker has a societal responsibility to safeguard the welfare of children
(both the person the defendant has abused and other children with whom
he could come into contact), such goals are no longer served when the
abuse happened in the distant past and the defendant is incarcerated: The
abuser is not a risk to the child he already abused or to other children,
both because the person he abused is no longer a child and because he is
incarcerated.
In sum, a social worker must navigate complex ethical terrain vis-A-
vis mandatory reporting requirements and duties to society at large when
representing a capital defendant who has abused a child. In navigating
this terrain, legal ethics suggest that the information remain confidential,
while the NASW Code of Ethics instructs social workers to remain mind-
ful of dual ethical responsibilities they have to their clients and to society
at large. The next Section explores how further guidance from the
NASW Code of Ethics might help social workers resolve such ethical
dilemmas when they arise on interdisciplinary capital defense teams.
d. Ethical responsibilities to colleagues
The Code's ethical standards contemplate and encourage social
workers to engage in "interdisciplinary collaboration. ' '222 In addition to
"ensur[ing] that such colleagues understand social workers' obligation to
220 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 556.036; 556.037 (West. 2003).
221 Mo. Am. STAT. § 556.037 (West. 2003).
222 NASW CODE OF Ermcs, supra note 19, § 2.03 ("Interdisciplinary Collaboration").
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respect confidentiality and any exceptions related to it,"223 the standards
explain that "[p]rofessional and ethical obligations of the interdiscipli-
nary team as a whole and of its individual members should be clearly
established. ' 224 With this language, the standards appear to contemplate
ethical dilemmas such as those that may arise in interdisciplinary capital
mitigation, placing the burden on social workers to ensure that ethical
obligations are "clearly established," but giving no guidance about how
to reconcile conflicting ethical mandates between law and social work.
Moreover, when conflicts do arise on interdisciplinary teams, a so-
cial worker "for whom a team decision raises ethical concerns should
attempt to resolve the disagreement through appropriate channels. '225
The standards do not define what constitutes an "appropriate channel,"
but they do specify that when "disagreement cannot be resolved, social
workers should pursue other avenues to address their concerns consistent
with client well being. '2 26 Again, it is unclear whether "other avenues"
means avenues within the social work profession (such as state boards or
licensing agencies), whether "other avenues" means legal licensing agen-
cies that govern the attorneys, or whether some combination of the two is
acceptable. The opaqueness of how to resolve the intertwining and con-
flicting ethical rules between law and social work is a reason why all
members of the interdisciplinary team should be aware of the potential
ethical issues members of their team might encounter and formulate a
plan about how the team will resolve such ethical issues before they oc-
cur.227 The ABA Model Rules and the Supplementary Guidelines hold
the capital defense attorney responsible for ensuring that all members of
the interdisciplinary team abide by legal ethics rules,228 but when legal
ethics do not coincide with social work ethics, the NASW Code of Ethics
contemplates that social workers also take responsibility for attempting
to reconcile competing ethical norms.
3. Responsibilities to a Client When His Decision Detrimentally
Affects Himself
The preceding two sections explore ethical tensions that arise be-
tween clients and clients' family members, as well as between clients'
interests and the interests of society at large. Much of the analysis in
these sections examines the extent to which the legal mandate of the
capital defense team-that the capital client is the team's only client-
223 Id. § 2.02 ("Confidentiality").
224 Id. § 2.03(a) ("Interdisciplinary Collaboration").
225 Id. § 2.03(b) ("Interdisciplinary Collaboration").
226 Id.
227 See discussion supra Introduction.
228 See discussion supra Part M.A., discussing MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 5.3
cmt. [1] (2008), and Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 14, Guideline 4.1(C).
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translates to the social-worker-trained mitigation specialist who is a
member of the interdisciplinary team. The ABA Model Rules and the
Supplementary Guidelines specify that mitigation specialists must cede
to the legal ethics that govern lawyers, even if the legal ethics do not
coincide with the mitigation specialist's own professional ethics. 229
Even when a social-worker-trained mitigation specialist accepts the
principle that she must cede to legal ethics, this position does not elimi-
nate other tensions that might arise when social work ethics and world
views compete with legal ethics and world views. The last scenario de-
scribes how a decision the capital client makes on his own behalf that is
detrimental to his own well-being may raise still other ethical issues with
a social-worker-trained mitigation specialist.
a. Ethical scenario three: The "volunteer" defendant
Imagine a capital defendant with an average IQ who is not mentally
insane or mentally ill. Before the trial begins, he announces to his capital
defense team that he appreciates all that the team is doing to try to win
his case, but if he is found guilty at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial,
he would prefer to die by state execution than to spend the rest of his life
in prison. This means he does not want the defense team to defend him
at the sentencing phase of his capital trial: if he loses at the guilt/inno-
cence phase and is found guilty of capital murder, he does not want to
introduce any mitigation evidence. He wants to be executed.
Before analyzing how social work ethics apply in this scenario, it is
important to note that capital defense attorneys themselves take diverse
positions on what to do from a legal ethics standpoint. 230 Some reluc-
tantly agree to the client's request while others work against it.231 Of
229 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 5.3 cmt. [I]; Supplementary Guidelines, supra
note 14, Guideline 4.1(C).
230 See, e.g., C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the Ethics
of Death Row Volunteering, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 849 (2000). In addition to capital de-
fense attorneys, legal scholars are also divided on this issue. See, e.g., Daniel R. Williams,
Mitigation and the Capital Defendant Who Wants to Die: A Study in the Rhetoric ofAutonomy
and the Hidden Discourse of Collective Responsibility, 57 HASTnNGS L.J. 693, 699 (2006)
("Commentators disagree on whether a capital defendant should be allowed to veto a mitiga-
tion presentation in the penalty phase. What they agree on are three things: (1) a capital
sentencing jury must consider mitigation evidence presented at trial, (2) a capital defendant
cannot be impeded in presenting mitigation evidence, whether by evidentiary ruling,
prosecutorial misconduct, or defense counsel's dereliction, and (3) a mitigation waiver in-
volves the collision between the Autonomy Ideal and the Reliability Ideal. They may even
agree on a fourth proposition, that because 'death is ... different,' what is legitimate or coun-
tenanced in a non-capital context does not perforce mean that the action or judgment is permit-
ted or countenanced when death is a possible punishment.").
231 In Rompilla, 545 U.S. 374 (2005), the Court observed that although Rompilla was
"uninterested in helping" to develop mitigation evidence and was sometimes "actively obstruc-
tive," id. at 381, capital trial counsel nonetheless had a duty to develop mitigation evidence,
and in failing to do so, counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 393. In a
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those who ignore the client's desire to die, some do so because they
believe the client does not fully understand the ramifications of this deci-
sion; they believe the client will change his mind later, when he is on
death row and it is too late to save his life. 232 Because it would be too
late to save his life later, these attorneys believe it is their legal duty to
try to change his mind and save his life at the time of trial, even when the
client states that he is firmly opposed to such action.233
Attorneys on both sides of the equation claim to find support in the
ABA Model Rules,234 which recognize that the lawyer must "consult"
with the client but leave the ultimate decision about the specific "means"
to employ up to the discretion of the attorney:235
[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions con-
cerning the objectives of representation and, as required
by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means
by which they are to be pursued.236
Some attorneys interpret the "objective of representation" as being
the goal of trying to save the client's life: the client cannot dictate the
more recent Court decision, Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007), the Court found that
a capital defendant who had told his trial attorneys not to present any mitigating evidence
could not establish prejudice under the Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel prong. Be-
cause Landrigan could not establish prejudice, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in finding that "Landrigan could not overcome § 2254(d)(2)'s bar to granting
federal habeas relief." Id. at 1941-42.
232 See Harrington, supra note 230, at 850 ("Preliminary evidence suggests the majority
[of death row inmates] elect to halt appeals at some point ... though most eventually change
their minds.").
233 See id. at 856 ("For the lawyer, the problem goes from subtle to sublime. On the one
hand, they have the obligation to zealously represent their clients, yet they also have to respect
the wishes of those they represent in the overall strategy of how the case will be defended.
The macabre solution would be for the defense counsel to join the prosecution in seeking the
defendant's execution."); Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 853, 857 (1987) (stating that when a capital defendant expressed a desire to die, "many
capital defense attorneys" believed the defendant's "sentiment posed an obstacle to effective
representation rather than an ethical dilemma," in part because the attorneys believed it was
their duty to try to change the defendant's mind, and most attorneys did successfully change
the client's mind).
234 See J.C. Oleson, Swilling Hemlock: The Legal Ethics of Defending a Client Who
Wishes to Volunteer for Execution, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 147, 179, 183 (2006) (observing
the "[u]selessness of the Model Rules," in this regard and that "capital attorneys see whatever
they project into them and act accordingly, . . . [a]nd because the Model Rules are largely
silent, lawyers are ultimately left to exercise their discretion in determining ethical conduct,
weighing up the values of autonomy against paternalism and using their own idiosyncratic
belief systems as decisionmaking heuristics"). In addition to capital defense attorneys being
divided on this issue, the "cases that have dealt with the ethical dimension of this problem are
split." White, supra note 233, at 857 (collecting cases).
235 See MODEL Rutr.Es OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.2(a) (2008) (the only client decisions by
which the lawyer must abide are decisions "as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury
trial and whether the client will testify").
236 Id.
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"means" to try to save his life, so attorneys claim they are ethically justi-
fied in choosing the "means" of trying to save his life, even when the
client claims he does not want those means employed. 237 Attorneys on
the other side of the argument believe that the client has asserted that the
"objective of representation" is not to save the client's life if the choice is
life without parole or death by execution. Following their perceived ethi-
cal obligations, these attorneys reluctantly cede to the client's wishes. 238
Assume a mitigation specialist is working on the capital defense
team of an attorney who refuses to give up at the sentencing phase of the
capital trial, no matter what the client says. This attorney tells the team
that the team will investigate the case and present mitigation at the sen-
tencing phase of the trial, even if the capital defendant does not want
them to present any mitigation evidence. A social-worker-trained miti-
gation specialist deciding how to reconcile the client's expressed wishes
with the attorney's actions, and also with relevant social work ethics
principles, would analyze this question by examining the final ethical
principle discussed below: respect the inherent dignity and worth of the
person.
b. Respect the dignity and worth of the person
Similar to the principle of pursuing social justice by promoting sen-
sitivity to vulnerable and oppressed groups, 239 the NASW Code of Ethics
contains an ethical principle directing social workers to respect a per-
son's inherent dignity and worth:
Social workers treat each person in a caring and respect-
ful fashion, mindful of individual differences and cul-
tural and ethnic diversity. Social workers promote
clients' socially responsible self-determination. Social
workers seek to enhance clients' capacity and opportu-
nity to change and to address their own needs. Social
workers are cognizant of their dual responsibility to cli-
237 White, supra note 233, at 857-58 ("[I]n allocating decision-making responsibility be-
tween criminal defendants and defense attorneys, the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct do not specifically identify the decision whether to oppose the death penalty as one of
those in which the defendant has ultimate authority.").
238 See, e.g., Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 299, 323 (1983) ("The legal obligations of the de-
fense counsel toward [defendants who wish to die] are less clear than is the case with coopera-
tive clients, and it could be argued that counsel has no obligation to insist upon helping those
who choose not to attempt to help themselves."); see also Fox, supra note 12, at 791 (asserting
that it is nonetheless the duty of defense counsel to investigate the case for mitigation because
"the client cannot make an informed decision as to how to proceed until the client knows what
is possible, and it is the lawyer's ethical duty to present the full smorgasbord, even to an
uninterested client").
239 See discussion supra Part II.B.l.c.i.
2009]
388 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18:337
ents and to the broader society. They seek to resolve
conflicts between clients' interests and the broader soci-
ety's interests in a socially responsible manner consis-
tent with the values, ethical principles, and ethical
standards of the profession. 240
In light of this ethical principle, a social-worker-trained mitigation
specialist must reconcile how she will fulfill the ethical principle of help-
ing her capital client promote his own "socially responsible self-determi-
nation"-his desire to die by execution-with the capital defense
attorney's instruction to ignore that wish.
A mitigation specialist in such a position would be able to reconcile
the attorney's legal position with her social work principles by working
with the client to help him understand the full ramifications of his deci-
sion and to ensure it is an informed decision, ultimately hoping to change
the client's position in the process of ensuring that he understands the
finality of the decision. But if the client does not change his mind, the
mitigation specialist must ultimately decide whether to follow the attor-
ney's instruction to help put on mitigation evidence during the sentenc-
ing phase of the trial, in direct defiance of the client's "self-
determination." Such a dilemma is a stark reminder of the complex, con-
flicting ethical norms that can arise on interdisciplinary capital defense
teams. Even when the team has agreed that legal ethics should prevail,
and even when the team has agreed to ways to resolve ethical conflicts
that arise between the defendant and the defendant's family members, or
between the defendant and society at large, the decisions the client makes
on his own behalf may throw still other ethical quandaries into the mix.
CONCLUSION
This Article explored the complex ethical landscape that capital de-
fense teams with social-worker-trained mitigation specialists might en-
counter. It also highlighted the capital attorney's duty to ensure that non-
lawyer team members are aware of, and comply with, the same ethical
obligations with which attorneys must comply. Although the NASW
Code of Ethics does not provide guidance about how to reconcile com-
peting ethical rules between law and social work, capital defense attor-
neys assert that legal rules should trump social work rules when a social
worker is employed as a member of the capital mitigation team. This
Article examined the strength of that position, while also illuminating the
inherent complexity within it. The NASW Code of Ethics for social
workers anticipates interdisciplinary collaboration but does not provide
guidance about how to reconcile competing ethical tensions on interdis-
240 NASW CODE OF ETHics, supra note 19, Ethical Principles.
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ciplinary capital defense teams. To understand the complexity of these
ethical tensions, this Article examined three scenarios in which such ten-
sions may arise.
In these and other ways, this Article underscored how the growth of
social workers employed as mitigation specialists on capital defense
teams may come with certain social costs. If capital attorneys expect
social-worker-trained mitigation specialists to cede to legal ethics when-
ever their ethical norms conflict, then people who have been trained as
social workers must be willing to forego some of their own profession's
principles in order to work on a capital team. Some social workers may
argue that this is too great a price to pay. Other people may wonder why
capital attorneys remain interested in hiring social workers to be capital
mitigation specialists, given the inherent ethical tensions they could bring
to the team. This Article showed how the complementary skills and
world vision that social workers bring to the capital defense team bal-
ances against the complex ethical tensions that also accompany them.
Because the world vision and skills that social workers learn during their
formal professional training-such as the development of psycho-social
histories-can be extremely valuable to effective mitigation investiga-
tion, mitigation specialists who have undergone similar training can
serve important roles on capital defense teams.
In sum, ever since the United States Supreme Court opened the door
to the jury's ability to consider any evidence offered in mitigation, 24'
capital mitigation specialists have strived to explore a wide range of in-
vestigative avenues. As part of that investigation, they undertake a sig-
nificant role working with defendants' families to develop mitigation
evidence. Even though capital mitigation specialists are well positioned
to identify and to help stop cycles of family violence before they impact
the society at large, in order to safeguard the capital defendant's constitu-
tional right to a fair trial, the mitigation specialist's job does not include
such interventions. These and other inherent ethical tensions between
law and social work must be recognized and discussed prior to conflicts
arising so that capital defense teams can formulate plans for resolving
conflicts if, and when, they arise. The ABA's Supplementary Guidelines
clarified that from the capital defense attorney's perspective, mitigation
specialists are agents of defense counsel who are bound by the same
rules of professional responsibility that govern defense counsel. 242 Per-
haps the NASW could issue a Supplemental Code of Ethics for Social
Workers Serving as Mitigation Specialists to explain that social workers
who are employed to develop mitigation evidence for capital defense
teams are agents of the team's capital defense attorneys, so they are
241 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-9 (1986).
242 See Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 14.
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therefore bound by the same rules of professional responsibility that gov-
ern the capital defense attorneys with whom they work (even if those
rules conflict with the NASW's Code of Ethics). This Supplemental
Code could also highlight the distinction between social workers who are
members of defense teams and social workers who are hired as indepen-
dent experts by defense counsel: social workers who are members of
capital defense teams abide by the same ethical rules that the attorneys
on their teams follow, whereas social workers who are hired as indepen-
dent experts abide by the NASW's Code of Ethics. 24 3
By understanding how ethical norms and world views from law and
social work interact, the Article strives to ensure that interdisciplinary
capital defense teams anticipate and resolve ethical conflicts in order to
safeguard the capital defendant's constitutional right to effective assis-
tance of counsel. In this way, capital mitigation specialists can continue
to help attorneys effectively safeguard the sacred constitutional rights of
the capital defendant.
243 See, e.g., SOCIAL WORKER's DESK REFERENCE (2d ed., forthcoming) (on file with
author), at 1058 (chapter written by Jose Ashford, an expert who has worked as both a mitiga-
tion specialist and a social worker, highlighting different roles of forensic social workers when
they testify as fact witnesses, expert witnesses, or education witnesses, and explaining that
"consultants to legal teams should not serve as an expert witness in the case for which they
were hired as consulting experts").
